台灣危矣

美國五角大樓剛剛發布的《國防戰略》將防衛重點收縮到西半球甚至美國本土。美國放棄台灣的可能性越來越大。

自從拜登多次明確表態一旦中共武統美軍會出兵干預到今天,都發生了什麼,導致美國這種失敗的戰略收縮?

第一,川普在“解放日”無端挑釁中國,中國圖窮匕現,亮出稀土王牌,川普不得不一退再退,比拜登時期做出更多讓步,中國仍然不鬆口,仍然要更多,川普一籌莫展。

第二,川普對盟友表現出的全面的蔑視和敵意,和對邪惡的普京表現出的無盡的愛慕,動搖了昔日的民主盟友們對美國的信任和忠誠。如果在台海開戰,美國不知道日本、澳洲等極其關鍵的盟友是否會支持它。這就是為什麼川普團隊一再以AUKUS協議來要挾澳洲保證在台海之戰中參戰,因為他們心虛。拜登政府絕不會做出這種缺乏自信、違反美國一貫風格的要求。這也體現了川普政府的光腳的下三濫的層次。

第三,由於川普親痛仇快的一貫做法,毫無原因地把印度推向中俄的陣營,邪惡軸心空前團結,空前強大,空前自信,空前進攻性。

第四,聽聽不久前的御前會議上川普政府的部長們對他的令人作嘔的肉麻歌頌。川普身邊已經沒有人能對他說,“總統先生,我們不能這麼做,後果是…,我們必須…” 現在他的身邊只剩下察言觀色挑他喜歡聽的話來說的無恥小人,尤其是毫無個人底線和操守的國防部長黑格賽斯。一旦高度情緒化、高度隨機性的川普做出了放棄台灣的決定,很可能得到身邊人的一致支持。

台灣危矣。

在我的《預言台海之戰全過程》中,我不得不引入中共裝備了想像中的極其先進的俄製S600防空導彈的干預,以便將局勢引入台灣喪失自衛能力,不得不請求美軍介入的方向。因為如果沒有這個干預,台灣必然挫敗共軍的入侵,我就沒有機會向讀者展示美軍介入後的局勢了。

然而,我寫此文時,美國還沒有選擇自宮。現在,美國經濟正在衰落,又得罪了所有盟友,又和俄國暗通款曲,中共的自信心爆棚,此時它很可能有決心進行一場長期的消耗戰,美軍不參戰,台灣作為一個孤島必然被吞下。

最近德州通過法律禁止的中國人購房。中國人裡川普的鐵桿死忠最多。

台灣的政評人裡除明居正教授外,一律是川粉。台灣人駁回了對親共賣台的內奸的罷免。你們大概正盼望著變成第二個香港?要知道,如果你們眾志成城誓死捍衛自己的主權和自由,那麼美國國會就更願意犧牲美國年輕人的生命去保衛你們。反之,當你們和中共不清不楚地曖昧,自己都不知道中共是敵是友,美國絕不會去干預。它神經病嗎?

求仁得仁啊。或許過去四十年的自由只是曇花一現,你們注定了還是要和大陸的騾馬們殊途同歸?

台灣危矣 有 “ 7 則迴響 ”

  1. the new national security strategy of the U.S. says

    A favorable conventional military balance remains an essential component of strategic competition. There is, rightly, much focus on Taiwan, partly because of Taiwan’s dominance of semiconductor production, but mostly because Taiwan provides direct access to the Second Island Chain and splits Northeast and Southeast Asia into two distinct theaters. Given that one-third of global shipping passes annually through the South China Sea, this has major implications for the U.S. economy. Hence deterring a conflict over Taiwan, ideally by preserving military overmatch, is a priority. We will also maintain our longstanding declaratory policy on Taiwan, meaning that the United States does not support any unilateral change to the status quo in the Taiwan Strait.

    We will build a military capable of denying aggression anywhere in the First Island Chain. But the American military cannot, and should not have to, do this alone.

    Our allies must step up and spend—and more importantly do-much more for collective defense. America’s diplomatic efforts should focus on pressing our First Island Chain allies and partners to allow the U.S. military greater access to their ports and other facilities, to spend more on their own defense, and most importantly to invest in capabilities aimed at deterring aggression. This will interlink maritime security issues along the First Island Chain while reinforcing U.S. and allies’ capacity to deny any attempt to seize Taiwan or achieve a balance of forces so unfavorable to us as to make defending that island impossible.

  2. 美国驻中国大使说川普坚持一个中国政策,遵守台湾关系法,希望台湾问题和平解决。这是念政策,说明模糊政策没有变。倒是他有一句话值得琢磨。他说我们希望美中关系不那么糟糕,让我们买一些时间。在什么事情发生之前?不远的将来会发生什么?结合最近美国对华回暖,说明美国希望最近几年不需要处理台湾任何危机

  3. The America first people believe that Ukraine and possibly Taiwan are not a vital interest. Forcing adversaries in these areas risks the very conflicts America needs to avoid. Ukraine is an example. The america first people might believe that NATO expansion into Eastern Europe was a mistake. 

    Today’s adversaries are reaching parity with the U.S. Any conflict with them could be extremely risky and costly. Hence, America is allowing for spheres of influence for major adversaries. On the other hand, America can still defend the border lands on either end of Eurasia. If adversaries make a move, America can create nightmarish quagmires to bog them down. 

    Ukraine might be lost already. Taiwan might soon realize it will be essentially on its own. 

    The island’s public opinion would change dramatically and quickly. 

    The outlying shoals of the Philippines are also in danger as the U.S. might decide to defend only the main territories of the Philippines. 

    Then there is NATO. Trump’s response to Russian intrusion into Poland was “here we go.”  It shows he expected this moment. Trump might be leaving nato to slowly dissolve. The Baltic states  better start planning. 

    This is a great reversal to the era of the Cold War. 

  4. In short term, Taiwan is able to fend off China’s invasion without the intervention of the US, unlike what most people believe. However, if China sees that the US is both weakened economically and isolated and friendless, which is happening, it may be resolved to engage in a long term war of attrition. Taiwan will not survive in this war if US is not committed to join the war. This is why I said Taiwan is in danger.

  5. Most people are asking the wrong question: will the U.S. intervene in a conflict over Taiwan? This perspective emphasizes what the U.S. would do AFTER a war breaks out. It’s as if nothing needs to be done between now and then. If Taiwan wants to survive, it must build the elements of that defense, right away. In the old days, the U.S. was able to simply make a promise and deter its adversary. This is why most people in Taiwan are stuck to the old mentality. They look for what america says, instead of what they should do. 

    That era is no more. Actions not words are the deterrence now. You are not going to survive if you expect to stay at home while America does it for you.

    The US will try to help Taiwan as much as possible, contingent on Taiwan’s willingness. But the U.S. will not defend Taiwan unconditionally.  

    That said, U.S. “intervention” is already underway. Real, pragmatic intervention. That is helping Taiwan build its defense. The new National Defense Authorization Act promulgates many plans to strengthen the island’s resilience. 

    Although it falls short of a security guarantee, these measures would only strengthen the defense and provide more options in times of emergency. Strong defense would allow for further flexibility. For example, America could still send Navy Seals on a 

    clandestine mission. 

    The Taiwanese should not get stuck in the pessimistic belief that “defense that is not absolute means absolutely no defense”.  Promises must be backed up by power. What can increase the cost of war? What makes you valuable and irreplaceable to others? Without preparedness, without will, there would be no hope. 

  6. 从另一角度讲,美国表现出动摇,中国会怎么想?中国能不打仗就不打仗。武统就算在军事上可以成功,仍然会有很大的弊端和风险。既然美国都动摇了,那么根本就不需要武统,通过和平手段分步走的实现统一。美国这是给和平统一留了个口子。于三方都是最理想情况。于是,战争短期内就不会发生。美国就能达到拖的目的。反正时间拖得越久对美国越有利。短期内美国赶不上中国军工的速度。中国呢要准备好起码还得几年。以后美国还可以再改政策。

  7. 美国国防战略的转变跟最近半年的事情关系不大,美国优先派近几年的文章都表达过这个意思。

    他们要盟友到第一线去,发挥他们本来就有的潜力,承担保卫自己的任务。这本身呢 无可厚非。威慑力最终来自自身。

    保护日本和菲律宾。要求韩国几乎完全承担国防(特别是如果在区域冲突中,韩国为了自保不让美国使用在韩国的基地,那么美国应将需要的军力撤出韩国)

    中国已经挑战美国在亚洲的唯一霸权地位。所以美国的策略不应该是完全压倒中国,而是制造区域平衡。

    台湾正在被要求承担绝大部分的国防。如果你的服役时间那么短,投入那么少,那你就不是认真对待这件事。但即便台湾能做到这一点,最终美国怎么做还是要看美国对具体情况的决定。那时恐怕不是川普总统。

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