In January 2025, just as Trump took office, I made a prediction in The First Signs That America’s Hungarian Transformation Has Begun:

Once a would-be dictator begins concentrating power, he enters a vicious cycle: the more power he grabs, the stronger the opposition grows, and the more insecure he feels — because a democratic leader who leaves office still lives in comfort, but a dictator who falls faces prison or death. So he grabs even harder.

At that point, his priorities change. The country’s interests take a back seat to the security of his own power. Anyone who opposes his power grab becomes a threat to his life and fortune; anyone who doesn’t oppose it — and especially anyone who helps it along — becomes his best friend.

…

China and Russia would love nothing more than to watch America slide into authoritarianism, so they will certainly extend a hand to an American dictator. And he, in turn — just as he changed his mind about ByteDance — will warm relations with Russia and China and build an alliance of dictators.

Hasn’t it come true?

Let’s take stock of what Comrade Vladimir Trump has accomplished in the first eight months of 2026. I guarantee that by the end, you will have no doubt who his allies are — and who his enemies are.

On China:

• Jan 13 — Export policy on H200-class chips, critical to the AI race, flipped from “presumption of denial" to “case-by-case review"
• Jan 22 — The TikTok deal closed: ByteDance kept roughly 20% of the equity and kept the algorithm
• Jan 23 — The National Defense Strategy declared, in writing, that America’s goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them"
• Feb 4 — An “excellent" phone call; Beijing’s readout has Trump saying “I want to see China succeed"
• Feb 8 — Jimmy Lai sentenced to 20 years — zero response from Washington
• Feb 10 — The DEA restored police-to-police cooperation with China’s Ministry of Public Security
• Feb 13 — The Pentagon yanked its “Chinese military companies" list update twice in two days (it would have added Alibaba, Baidu and BYD)
• Feb 20 — The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs; the White House replaced them with a country-blind scheme under which China’s tariff burden fell more than anyone else’s on earth
• Feb 26 — Nvidia received its first license to export H200s to China
• Mid-year — Enforcement of the Uyghur forced-labor law quietly ground to a halt (customs seizures collapsed by 87%)
• May 12 — To Xi Jinping: “You’re a great leader… it’s an honor to be your friend"
• May 14 — Ten Chinese companies (Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, JD.com and others) cleared to buy H200s
• May 14 — “A constructive China–US relationship of strategic stability" written into the record; the White House readout never mentioned Taiwan at all
• May 15 — “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent"; called arms sales to Taiwan “a very good negotiating chip"
• May 15 — Human rights weren’t on the summit agenda; Jimmy Lai got one mention and was dropped
• May 18 — A US–China Board of Trade and Board of Investment established; a $30 billion mutual tariff-reduction framework agreed in principle
• May 19 — The $14 billion arms package for Taiwan frozen
• May 28 — US–China maritime military consultations resumed in Hawaii
• Jun 2 — The US Trade Representative formally asked industry which China tariffs to cut — the first exercise of its kind since 2018
• Jun 8 — CNOOC, COSCO and eight other firms removed from the “Chinese military companies" list
• Jun 16 — The words “Indo-Pacific" abolished: Indo-Pacific Command renamed back to Pacific Command
• Jun 20 — “You know who is very smart? President Xi of China"
• Jul 17 — Hong Kong sanctions dismantled wholesale: all 48 officials — including John Lee and Carrie Lam — removed from the SDN list; China’s Commerce Ministry called it “an important step in fulfilling the consensus reached in the trade talks"
• Jul 27 — Beijing announced that Washington had promised to cap replacement tariffs at 20%
• Aug 13 — America’s last aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, the USS George Washington, pulled out and sent to the Middle East; Global Times celebrated a “zero-US-carrier zone"
• Aug 17 — The US–South Korea “Ulchi Freedom Shield" exercise gutted: eleven days cut to five, the entire counterattack phase cancelled
• Aug 19 — Taiwan Strait transits this term on track to be half of previous administrations’ (14, versus 32 under Biden)
• Aug 19 — The first H200 shipments landed in China: roughly ten thousand chips each for ByteDance and Tencent

And for America’s European NATO allies?

• Jan 5 — The Greenland crisis reignited: Trump again refused to rule out military force; Hegseth said the military option is “always on the table"; Trump: “One way or the other, we’re going to have Greenland"
• Jan 7 — Withdrawal from 66 international organizations and treaties in one sweep, including the UN climate treaty; Europe condemned “a new low"
• Jan 17 — 10% tariffs on eight European NATO allies (Denmark, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland), with a threat of 25% by June 1, “until a deal is reached for the complete and total purchase of Greenland"; the eight issued a joint protest
• Feb 5 & 19 — Open interference in an EU member state’s election: a full-throated endorsement of Hungary’s Orbán
• Feb 15 — At Munich, Rubio carried the National Security Strategy’s message, blaming Europe’s “civilizational decline" on the “climate cult" and “mass migration"; EU chief diplomat Kallas formally rejected the “civilizational erasure" thesis
• Feb 20 — Hours after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, a 10% global surcharge was imposed under Section 122 — denying Europe any relief from the ruling and knocking the legal foundation out from under the US–EU trade deal
• Mar 15 — For his war on Iran, Trump demanded that seven countries — most of them European — send warships to force open the Strait of Hormuz, warning “we will remember" those who refuse; EU leaders collectively refused
• Mar 17 — Rebuffed, he erupted: “We no longer ‘need,’ or desire, the NATO countries’ assistance — WE NEVER DID!"
• Apr 1 — Said he was “strongly considering" leaving NATO; Rubio said America would “re-examine" NATO’s value
• Apr 7 — Called NATO a “paper tiger" that Putin doesn’t fear; in the same breath, back to Greenland: “We want Greenland. They don’t want to give it to us. And I said, ‘bye bye'"
• May 1 — Retribution against allies who refused his war: ordered more than 5,000 troops out of Germany (“cutting a lot further than that"), threatened to pull troops from Italy and Spain (“Spain has been horrible" — Spain had refused base access, Italy had denied use of a Sicilian airbase)
• May 4 — Accused the EU of “not complying" with the Turnberry trade deal and threatened 25% tariffs on European cars; the Eurogroup president rejected the accusation and said “all options are on the table"
• May 14 — Cancelled the planned 4,000-troop deployment to Poland; the UK, Poland and Lithuania were told deliveries of American weapons would be delayed (the Iran war had drained the stockpiles)
• May 21 (collateral damage) — The Hormuz crisis drove up oil prices and inflation, forcing the EU to cut its 2026 growth forecast
• Jun 26 — Threatened 100% tariffs on European imports if Europe implemented digital services taxes
• Jul 8 — At the NATO summit in Ankara: “Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They don’t participate. They don’t pay. I don’t want anything to do with Spain" — then, turning to Treasury Secretary Bessent: “Cut off all trade with Spain, please, including visits"
• Jul 24 — Launched a Section 301 investigation into the EU’s own tech laws, the DMA and DSA (after Google’s €890 million fine): “Europe is not a piggy bank"; the same day, threatened more tariffs to counter the EU’s “hefty fines" on American tech companies
• Jul 31 — Section 232 pharmaceutical tariffs took effect: the EU and Switzerland capped at 15% thanks to their deals; the UK facing 110% until it signs a drug-pricing agreement
• Aug 7 — Kept pressuring reluctant European governments to join a Hormuz naval coalition
• Aug 16 — Gutted the US–South Korea exercises and publicly praised Kim Jong-un; an EU official openly criticized his “attitude toward allies" — Europe saw its own future in what happened to Seoul

I trust that from these two long lists, you can see it plainly: Comrade Vladimir Trump has been hard-working. Quietly, comprehensively, and at a relentless pace, he is executing a 180-degree turn of the United States: dictatorial China is now his ally, and democratic Europe his enemy.

Now think about what he said just days ago: Kim Jong-un is his good friend who has never caused any trouble.

Bare in mind what Kim Jong-un actually is doing right now. Tens of thousands of his elite troops are fighting in the heart of European, above which his missiles are raining down. NATO allies — Germany, France, Britain, Poland — agree unanimously that Russia, with Kim’s full backing, has already started a hybrid war against Europe, and that a real shooting war is imminent.

Would you call a man who poses a mortal threat to your allies your good friend?

Who are China, Russia, North Korea and Europe to Comrade Trump — friend or enemy? Could it be any more obvious?

The extent of Comrade Trump’s admiration for Comrade Kim Jong-un must be common knowledge by now. Time and again, he has pulled out the letters Kim sent him and shown them off to his guests.

There’s one thing I don’t understand. If my housekeeper wrote me a letter, I wouldn’t show it off. If a colleague or friend wrote me a letter, I wouldn’t show that off either. But if Jack Ma or the Australian prime minister wrote me a letter, then perhaps I would. So when Comrade Trump repeatedly shows off Kim Jong-un’s letters, doesn’t that suggest that, somewhere in his subconscious, he regards Kim as being far above him in status?

After he issued this effusive statement to his idol, his idol didn’t even bother responding. Instead, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, said: “We have no interest in it at all.”

American readers, please tell me: since your country was founded in 1776, has there ever been another president who so abjectly kissed the ass of a murderous, cold-blooded devil, only to be treated with such indifference in return?

Only two years into his tenor, Comrade Trump has increased America’s debt from 36 trillion to 40. America’s financial collapse appears to be just around the corner. His big and beautiful tax cut and his war against Iran greatly accelerated the debt explosion.

Was it because he is an idiot? Even if you randomly pick your decisions, you can still get half of them right. How come everything Comrade Trump did was a stab at the most vulnerable spot of America?

I have read history, ancient and modern, Chinese and Western, and I follow world politics and military affairs closely. I have never seen such a meticulous fool.

2025年1月，川普剛上台，在《美國開始匈牙利化的第一批信號》中，我預言：

一旦獨裁者開始集權，他就會進入一個惡性循環：越集權，反對力量越強大，他的不安全感越強（因為民主國家的領袖下台仍然吃香喝辣，但獨裁者下台會入獄甚至肉體死亡），他就越想集權。

那時，集權者心裡的優先順序就變了，國家的利益就要讓位於自己權力的穩固，任何反對自己集權的人都是對自己身家性命的威脅，任何不反對自己集權、尤其是會幫助自己集權的人，都是最好的盟友。

…

中俄一定會樂見美國滑入集權體制，所以他們一定會向美國獨裁者伸出援手。所以後者一定會像對字節跳動回心轉意一樣，與俄國、中國改善關係，構建獨裁者同盟。

現在應驗了沒有？

咱們來盤點一下弗拉基米爾·川普同志在2026年的8個月裏做了什麼——保證你能毫無疑問地看出誰是他的盟友，誰是他的敵人。

關於中國：

• 1月13日 — 對於AI競賽至關重要的H200等級晶片，對華出口政策由「原則否准」改為「逐案審查」
• 1月22日 — TikTok交割完成：字節保住約20%股權與演算法
• 1月23日 — 《國防戰略》寫明目標「不支配中國，也不封鎖或羞辱他們」
• 2月4日 — 「極好」的通話；中方通稿記載川普說「我希望看到中國成功」
• 2月8日 — 黎智英判刑20年——美方零反制
• 2月10日 — 緝毒局恢復與中國公安部的警務合作
• 2月13日 — 五角大廈兩天內兩度撤回「中國軍工企業」名單更新（原要列入阿里、百度、比亞迪）
• 2月20日 — 最高法院推翻IEEPA關稅；白宮改用不分國別的替代方案，中國降稅幅度全球最大
• 2月26日 — 輝達拿到第一張H200對中出口許可
• 年中 — 新疆強迫勞動執法悄悄停擺（海關扣貨額暴跌87%）
• 5月12日 — 對習近平說：「你是偉大的領導人……能做你的朋友是我的榮幸」
• 5月14日 — 十家中國企業（阿里、騰訊、字節、京東等）獲准採購H200
• 5月14日 — 「中美戰略穩定關係」入文；美方通稿完全不提台灣
• 5月15日 — 「我不希望有誰跑去搞獨立」；稱對台軍售是「很好的談判籌碼」
• 5月15日 — 人權不在峰會議程；黎智英提了一句就算了
• 5月18日 — 成立美中貿易委員會與投資委員會；300億美元互降關稅框架原則達成
• 5月19日 — 140億美元對台軍售包裹遭凍結
• 5月28日 — 美中海上軍事磋商在夏威夷復會
• 6月2日 — 貿易代表署正式徵詢業界該砍哪些對中關稅（2018年以來首次）
• 6月8日 — 將中海油、中遠等十家企業從「中國軍工企業」制裁名單中移除。
• 6月16日 — 「印太」二字取消：印太司令部改回太平洋司令部
• 6月20日 — 「你知道誰非常聰明嗎——中國的習主席」
• 7月17日 — 全面解除對香港的制裁，48名官員（含李家超、林鄭月娥）全數移出SDN名單；中國商務部稱這是「落實經貿會談共識的重要一步」
• 7月27日 — 北京稱美方承諾替代關稅上限20%
• 8月13日 — 美軍最後一艘航母（華盛頓號）撤出西太平洋，調往中東；《環球時報》慶祝「美軍航母零存在區」
• 8月17日 — 美韓「乙支自由之盾」演習遭砍：十一天變五天，反攻階段整個取消
• 8月19日 — 本屆任內台海航行次數腰斬（14次 vs 拜登32次）
• 8月19日 — 首批H200運抵中國：字節、騰訊各約一萬顆

對於歐洲北約盟友呢？

• 1月5日 — 格陵蘭危機重燃：再度拒絕排除動武，赫格塞斯稱軍事手段「永遠是選項」；川普：「不管用哪種方式，我們都會拿到格陵蘭」
• 1月7日 — 一口氣退出66個國際組織與條約，包括聯合國氣候公約；歐洲齊聲譴責「新低點」
• 1月17日 — 對八個歐洲北約盟國（丹麥、英國、德國、法國、荷蘭、挪威、瑞典、芬蘭）課10%關稅，揚言6月1日加到25%，「直到達成完整且徹底購買格陵蘭的協議為止」；八國發表聯合聲明抗議
• 2月5日與19日 — 公然介入歐盟成員國選舉 ，為匈牙利奧爾班站台
• 2月15日 — 魯比歐在慕尼黑安全會議延續《國安戰略》調門，把歐洲的「文明衰落」歸咎於「氣候邪教」與「大規模移民」；歐盟外交高代表卡拉斯正式反駁「文明抹除」論
• 2月20日 — 最高法院推翻IEEPA關稅後，數小時內改用第122條課10%全球附加稅——不讓歐洲從判決中得到任何喘息，也抽掉了美歐貿易協議的法律地基
• 3月15日 — 為打伊朗，點名要求七個（多為歐洲）國家派軍艦打通荷姆茲海峽，警告「拒絕的我們會記住」；歐盟領導人集體拒絕軍事介入
• 3月17日 — 遭拒後發文開罵：「我們不再『需要』、也不想要北約國家的協助——我們從來就不需要！」；
• 4月1日 — 稱「認真考慮」退出北約；魯比歐說美國將「重新審視」北約的價值
• 4月7日 — 罵北約是普京根本不怕的「紙老虎」；同場重提格陵蘭：「我們要格陵蘭。他們不給。我就說『拜拜』」
• 5月1日 — 報復拒戰盟友：下令從德國撤軍5000人以上（「還會砍得更多」）、揚言從義大利與西班牙撤軍（「西班牙爛透了」——西班牙曾拒絕基地使用、義大利拒借西西里空軍基地）
• 5月4日 — 以歐盟「不履行」特恩貝里協議為由，揚言對歐洲汽車課25%關稅；歐元集團主席駁斥指控，稱「所有選項都在桌上」
• 5月14日 — 取消原定4000人的波蘭部署；英國、波蘭、立陶宛被告知美製武器交付將延遲（伊朗戰爭耗盡彈藥庫存）
• 5月21日（背景損害） — 霍爾姆斯海峽危機推高油價與通膨，歐盟被迫下修2026年成長預測
• 6月26日 — 揚言若歐洲實施數位服務稅，對歐洲進口品課100%關稅
• 7月8日 — 北約峰會（安卡拉）上：「西班牙是北約裡糟糕透頂的夥伴。他們不參與、不繳錢。我不想跟西班牙有任何瓜葛」——轉頭對財長貝森特說：「把跟西班牙的貿易全砍了，麻煩你，連訪問也一起」
• 7月24日 — 對歐盟《數位市場法》《數位服務法》本身啟動301條款調查（Google被DMA罰8.9億歐元後）：「歐洲不是提款機」；同日揚言加碼關稅反制歐盟對美國科技公司的「高額罰款」
• 7月31日 — 232條款藥品關稅生效：歐盟與瑞士因有協議上限15%；英國在達成藥價協議前面對110%
• 8月7日 — 持續施壓不情願的歐洲各國加入荷姆茲海軍聯盟
• 8月16日 — 砍美韓聯合軍演、公開讚金正恩，歐盟官員公開批評他「對待盟友的態度」，歐洲從首爾的遭遇看到了自己的處境

我相信，從上述兩個長長的清單，你應該可以看出，弗拉基米爾·川普同志真的很勤奮，他真的沒閒着，他正在低調、全面、緊鑼密鼓地將美國進行180度的大轉向：獨裁的中國是他的盟友，民主的歐洲是他的敵人。

尤其是他幾天前剛剛發表的言論和決定：金正恩是他的好朋友，一直沒有找麻煩。

要知道，金正恩的幾萬精銳軍隊正在歐洲腹地作戰，金正恩的導彈導彈正在歐洲上空紛飛，北約盟友包括德國、法國、英國、波蘭一致認爲，金正恩全力支持的俄國已經對歐洲發起了灰色戰爭，而真正的開槍開炮的戰爭已經迫在眉睫。

你會管正在對你的盟友構成致命威脅的人叫好朋友嗎？

中、俄、北韓、歐洲在川普同志眼裏是敵是友，是不是昭然若揭？

川普同志對金正恩同志的崇拜程度應該是盡人皆知吧？他無數次把金正恩給他的信拿出來向賓客炫耀。我不明白一點：我家保姆給我寫的信，我不會拿出來炫耀；我同事或朋友給我的信，我也不會炫耀；馬雲或者澳洲總理給我的信，我或許會炫耀。川普同志一次次拿出金正恩的信來炫耀，是不是說明，在他的潛意識裡，金的地位遠遠高於他？

他對偶像發出這個熱情洋溢的聲明後，他的偶像理都沒理，他妹妹金與正說：“我們對此毫無興趣。”

美國的讀者們，請告訴我，從你們國家1776年建國以來，可曾有任何一個總統如此卑賤地去親一個殺人不眨眼的惡魔的屁股，結果被人家如此冷遇的？

上台二年，美國國債從36萬億美元突破40萬億。美國財政破產、經濟崩潰呼之欲出。弗拉基米爾·川普同志的大減稅和伊朗戰爭起到了很大的加速效果。

川普同志是白癡嗎？就是完全隨機決定，至少你還有一半做對的可能性，對不對？怎麼可能刀刀都奔着美國的命門呢？

反正熟讀古今中外歷史、密切跟蹤中外政治軍事的我，沒見過一個如此全面佈局、緊鑼密鼓、刀刀見血的蠢貨。

Ukraine’s drones are wrecking Russia’s economy on a massive scale — oil refineries, the enormous warehouse complexes of Wildberries (Russia’s Amazon), ports and grain export facilities — posing a grave threat to Russia’s ability to sustain its war of aggression. I discussed this in depth in Ukraine War (44): A Summary of the Current State of the War and Ukraine War (45): The Relationship Between Ukraine and NATO Is Quietly Changing — Ukraine is turning the tables on its attacker.

But at the same time, because Vladimir Trump has completely cut off the supply of Patriot missiles to Ukraine (which doesn’t surprise me in the least), Russian ballistic missiles are killing Ukrainian civilians in ever greater numbers. In the coming winter, they will destroy Ukraine’s power and heating systems, threatening the country’s very survival.

Now the whole world is asking the same question:

“If Ukraine’s drones can inflict such devastating losses on Russia and the latter has no counting measure, why can’t they take out Russia’s missile factories?“

No media outlet, and none of the military experts they interview, has given a clear answer.

What makes Ukraine’s drones so hard for Russia to counter is not advanced technology like stealth or speed. They are slow, they fly low, and they have no stealth features or infrared-signature reduction of any kind. Russian air defence missiles can easily shoot down anyone of them. But precisely because there is nothing high-tech about them, they are dirt cheap — a small fraction of the cost of a Russian anit-air missile, so Ukraine doesn’t care how many get shot down. Quite the opposite: the more Russia shoots down, the faster its treasury bleeds. Ukraine’s strategy is to launch drones in overwhelming numbers, so that, after Russia’s air defence missiles run dry, and after subtracting the drones downed by direct-fire weapons around the target, enough still get through to hit it.

But drones like these are no threat to a Russian missile factory.

The buildings that house Russia’s production of expensive missiles are nothing like an ordinary factory, with a roof of corrugated sheet metal a few millimetres thick over a layer of insulation — the kind that a drone carrying a few kilograms of explosives can blow open and set on fire. Most of the missile factories are built of military-grade, blast-resistant reinforced concrete. Even hundreds of kilograms of explosives detonating outside a building like that would not do meaningful damage. Every munition designed to defeat hardened facilities of this kind has an extremely tough casing, substantial weight and a delayed-action fuze; it must strike the target’s critical point with pinpoint accuracy, at very high speed and at exactly the right angle, punching through the hardened layer before detonating inside.

And once an aircraft has to weigh hundreds of kilograms or even several tonnes, fly at very high speed, and deliver that kind of precision and angle of attack, it no longer costs merely 50 thousand dollars. Its price jumps to hundreds of thousands — approaching that of a Russian air defence missile. With drones like that, Ukraine could no longer launch 500 a day, shrug off the losses, and count on 5% getting through. It could launch no more than twenty or 50 a day — and Russian air defences could shoot down every last one.

Ukraine’s overall technological base and industrial scale are far smaller than Russia’s. If Ukraine went down this road, it would be pitting its weaknesses against the enemy’s strengths — and it would inevitably lose the war.

If these weapons are to survive Russian air defences, they need stealth and low infrared signatures — like Storm Shadow — at which point they cost even more than the Russian missiles. Ukraine today has neither the technology nor the money for that.

This is why Ukraine’s drones have set Russia ablaze with smoke rising everywhere, yet leave its missile factories untouched.

All Ukraine can do now is strike at the root: bring Russia’s economy to collapse, until it can no longer sustain the war.

烏軍的無人機正在大規模地摧毀俄國的經濟，比如石油冶煉設施、俄國的亞馬遜——野莓的巨大的倉儲中心、港口和糧食出口設施，對俄國繼續侵略戰爭的能力造成了極大威脅。我在《 烏戰深度解析（44）：烏戰現狀總結 》和《烏戰深度解析（45）：烏克蘭和北約的關係正在悄然變化 》中深入討論了這個問題——烏克蘭正在反客爲主。

但同時，因爲弗拉基米爾·川普徹底切斷了對烏克蘭的愛國者導彈的供應（我一點都不喫驚），俄國的彈道導彈正在以越來越大的規模殺死烏克蘭的老百姓，在即將到來的冬季，它們會摧毀烏克蘭的電力、供暖系統，對烏克蘭的生存造成巨大威脅。

現在，全世界都在問這個問題：

“既然烏軍的無人機能夠對俄國造成如此慘重的損失，讓俄國束手無策，爲什麼不能全面摧毀俄國生產導彈的工廠？”

沒有任何媒體和媒體所採訪的軍事專家給出了清晰明了的答案。

烏軍的無人機之所以讓俄軍束手無策，靠的不是隱形、高速等高科技。它們速度慢，高度底，沒有任何隱身、減少紅外特徵的能力，俄軍防空導彈有能力打下任何一架，但正是因爲沒有高科技，它們非常便宜，是俄軍導彈的幾十分之一，所以烏軍根本不怕任何一架被打下來，相反，打下來的越多，俄國財政的失血就越多。烏軍靠的是發射數目極大的無人機，在俄軍防空導彈打完後，在扣除被目標周圍直射武器打下來的之後，仍然有足夠的數量擊中目標。

但這樣的無人機對俄國的導彈工廠沒有威脅。

俄國的生產昂貴導彈的工廠廠房不像一般工廠那樣，房頂是幾毫米厚的波浪形鐵皮，下面是隔溫材料，一架載幾公斤炸藥的無人機就能炸壞並點着火。它們大多是由軍用級別的防爆破的鋼筋混凝土建造的。即便是幾百公斤的炸藥，在這種混凝土廠房的外面爆炸 ，都無法造成足夠的破壞。所有針對這類加固設施的彈藥，都有極其堅硬的外殼、足夠的重量和延時爆炸引信，以極高的速度和準確的角度，準確擊中目標的關鍵部位，穿透加固層後在內部引爆。

而當一架飛行器需要幾百公斤甚至幾噸重，以極高的速度飛行，保證極高的精度和角度時，這架飛行器就不可能幾萬美元一架了，相反，它的價格就到了幾十萬美元，接近了俄軍防空導彈的價位。這樣的無人機，烏克蘭就沒法每天發射500架，任憑大多數被擊落，只要5%擊中就行。這樣的無人機，烏克蘭一天能發射的數目超不過二三十枚，俄軍的防空導彈可以擊落全部。

烏克蘭的綜合科技水平和工業規模遠小於俄國，如果烏軍朝這個方向走下去，它就是在以己之短攻敵人之長，必然輸掉戰爭。

而如果想讓這些飛行器不被俄軍導彈擊落，它們就必須有隱身、低紅外特徵，比如風暴陰影，那麼它們的價格就會比俄軍的防空導彈還貴，烏克蘭現在沒有這樣的科技和財力。

這就是爲什麼烏克蘭的無人機把俄國炸得處處濃煙滾滾，卻單單放過俄國的導彈工廠的原因。

烏克蘭現在能做的，只有釜底抽薪，讓俄國的經濟崩潰，無力支撐其戰爭努力。

From the start of the war until a year ago, Ukraine was, in NATO’s eyes, a great burden — its war with Russia carried the risk of dragging NATO into war with Russia, even nuclear war.

Imagine you are the boss of one of New York’s two great crime families — the Gambinos. You and the Genovese family each have your own turf, live and let live, each raking in fortunes and living the high life. Then one day, one of your made men gets into a fight with the Genoveses — a blood feud, irreconcilable. If you don’t back him, you’ll be seen as a coward with no sense of loyalty, and your soldiers will desert you. But if you do back him, the Gambinos and the Genoveses could be plunged into a fight to the death — rivers of blood, both families crippled.

So you have no choice but to prop him up just enough to keep him from being wiped out, while carefully avoiding a total rupture with the Genoveses. Day after day you walk a tightrope; one wrong step and the sky falls in. Deep down, you surely wish you could turn back time and never have taken this man into the family.

From the start of the war until a year ago, this is largely how NATO saw Ukraine.

But over the past year, Ukraine’s fighting power has begun to swell rapidly. I summed this up in my August 2, 2026 piece, Ukraine War (44): A Summary of the Current State of the War. Though it lacks the death-defying sense of honor of the British and American militaries, the Ukrainian army — forged and winnowed through four years of bloody war — is one of only two armies in the world fully adapted to warfare in the drone age, and the only army in the world guaranteed to fight to a standstill, at minimal cost, against the Russian army that has been forged and winnowed through the same four years of bloody war and is equally adapted to drone-age warfare. If the Russian army were to attack Poland, as NATO intelligence has predicted, we would very likely see the Polish army — far better equipped than the Ukrainians — suffer great losses; even a collapse would not be entirely out of the question.

Recent reports say that the anti-missile interceptor Ukraine has been developing with NATO support may enter production within months. Bear in mind that anti-missile interceptors are far harder to build than missiles, and the Russian army currently possesses essentially no anti-missile capability — the much-hyped S-400 offers essentially no defense against the NATO missiles Ukraine launches. If Ukraine’s interceptor really can enter production that quickly, then the overall strength of the Ukrainian army may in fact rank among the very best in Europe.

It’s as if that man of yours who fought the Genoveses had, through years of bloody struggle, built up a crew of crack shots and master knife-fighters, fearless and ferocious, who fought the Genoveses to a draw with not much help from you — while your own soldiers, after years of soft living, can no longer shoot straight and faint at the sight of blood. Would you still treat him as a burden then?

What would be going through your mind?

“I’d better keep on this man’s good side and make sure he stays with me. Otherwise, if he ever goes over to the Genoveses one day, I’m finished."

A year ago, NATO would not agree to accept Ukraine, because Ukraine was continuously losing ground. The very second Ukraine joined NATO, NATO would automatically be at war with Russia — because under Article 5 of the NATO charter, if new member Ukraine comes under large-scale armed attack, NATO must join the fight.

Today, for the very same reason, NATO still will not agree to accept Ukraine.

But in NATO’s eyes, Ukraine is no longer a burden. It is now a vital partner that must be respected and carefully maintained, because it is one of the strongest military powers in Europe. The rich experience and technology Ukraine has accumulated on the battlefield are an indispensable resource for NATO. Without that experience and technology, if a battle-hardened Russian army that has mastered drone-age warfare were to attack NATO, NATO could suffer devastating losses — its defensive lines might even collapse.

A worse possibility — though a small one — is that someday a Ukrainian strongman in the mold of Putin comes to power. At that point, if NATO still refuses Ukraine membership as before, still helps Ukraine only with one hand tied behind its back, he could say to the Ukrainian people:

“Look! We sacrificed a million of our young to shield Europe from Russia’s assault, and still Europe shows no gratitude, still shuts us out. Europe is not the hope for Ukraine’s security. We must normalize relations with Russia."

If he could consolidate power in Ukraine the way Putin has in Russia, then the odds of his becoming Putin’s ally would be high. An alliance between two of Europe’s foremost military powers would be the ultimate nightmare for Europe — and for the world.

Remember what I always tell my readers: what goes unsaid often matters more than what is said?

Though you will hear nothing of this from NATO publicly, the relationship between NATO and Ukraine has already quietly changed — no longer a one-way valve with NATO endlessly transfusing blood into Ukraine, but a near-equal partnership in which each side urgently needs the other.

從開戰直到一年前，烏克蘭在北約眼裏是一個大累贅，它和俄國的戰爭有導致北約和俄國之間發生戰爭甚至核戰爭的危險。

好比你是上海灘二大幫派之一，青紅幫的幫主。你和斧頭幫之間各有各的地盤，彼此相安無事，各自大發其財，喫香喝辣。忽然有一天，你的一個兄弟和斧頭幫打起來了，彼此不共戴天。如果你不幫他，會被視爲膽小如鼠，不講義氣，必然衆叛親離。但如果你替他撐腰，那青紅幫和斧頭幫則可能陷入你死我活的火併，血流成河，元氣大傷。

所以，你不得不一邊替他撐腰，防止他被滅門，一邊又小心不和斧頭幫徹底撕破臉。你終日像走鋼絲一樣小心，一步走錯，天就塌下來了。你心裏一定希望時光倒回，你沒收這個兄弟弟入夥。

從開戰直到一年前，北約就是這樣看烏克蘭的。

但最近一年以來，烏克蘭的戰力開始迅速膨脹。我在2026年8月2日的烏戰深度解析（44）：烏戰現狀總結一文中總結了這一點。雖然缺乏英美軍隊的視死如歸的榮譽感，但經過了四年血腥的戰爭的淘汰和冶煉，烏軍是世界上唯二之一的完全適應了無人機時代的戰爭的軍隊，也是世界上唯一一隻保證能以最小的代價和同樣經過了四年血腥的戰爭的淘汰和冶煉，同樣適應了無人機時代戰爭的俄軍打成平手的軍隊。如果俄軍如北約情報所預言的那樣進攻波蘭，我們很可能看到裝備遠好於烏軍的波蘭軍隊在最初階段的損失遠遠大於烏軍，甚至土崩瓦解都不是完全沒有可能。

最近的消息說，烏克蘭在北約支持下研製的反導導彈可能於幾個月內就投產。要知道，反導導彈比導彈難度大得多，現在俄軍基本上不具備任何反導能力，吹得神乎其神的S400對烏克蘭發射的北約導彈基本上沒有防禦能力。如果烏克蘭的反導導彈能夠這麼快投產，那麼烏軍的整體實力實際上可能是歐洲數一數二的。

就好比你那個和斧頭幫火併的兄弟，在幾年的浴血奮戰中發展出一隻槍法如神、刀法嫺熟、敢打敢拼的隊伍，基本上不需要你的幫助，就和斧頭幫打了個平手，而你自己手下的隊伍經過常年的養尊處優已經槍打不準，看見血就暈，這時，你還會把他當累贅嗎？

這時你心裏會怎麼想？

“我可得與這個兄弟搞好關係，確保他一直站在我這邊，否則，一旦他將來某一天倒向斧頭幫，我分分鐘被滅。”

一年前北約絕不會同意烏克蘭加入，因爲烏克蘭在持續失地。烏克蘭在加入北約的那一秒鐘，北約就自動與俄國處在戰爭狀態，因爲根據北約章程第五條，新成員烏克蘭遭到大規模武裝進攻，北約必須應戰。

現在，因爲同樣的原因，北約仍然不會同意烏克蘭加入。

但在北約眼裏，烏克蘭已經不再是一個累贅，而是一個必須尊重且努力維繫的重要伙伴，因爲它是歐洲戰力最強的軍事強國之一。烏克蘭在戰場上積累的豐富經驗和技術是北約不可或缺的寶貴資源，沒有這些經驗和技術，一旦久經戰陣、掌握了無人機時代戰爭的俄軍向北約進攻，北約可能付出慘重的損失，甚至防線崩潰。

更糟糕的可能性——雖然很小——是將來某一天，一個普京一樣的烏克蘭強人上台。那時，如果北約仍然像以前那樣拒絕烏克蘭加入，在幫助烏克蘭上束手束腳，他就可能對烏克蘭人說：

“你們看！我們犧牲了一百萬年輕人，爲歐洲擋住了俄國的進攻，但歐洲仍然不感謝我們，仍然將我們拒之門外。歐洲不是烏克蘭安全的希望，我們必須和俄國關係正常化。”

如果他能像普京一樣在烏克蘭完成集權，那麼他成爲普京的盟友的可能性就很大。二個歐洲戰力數一數二的國家結盟，將是歐洲乃至世界的終極噩夢。

還記得我總對我的讀者們說，沒說出的話往往比說出來的更重要？

雖然你們聽不到北約的任何這方面的言論，但北約和烏克蘭之間的關係已經悄然變化，不再是北約不斷向烏克蘭輸血的單向閥，而是一個彼此迫切需要對方的近乎平等的伙伴關係。

I just heard that Joe Biden’s days are counted. As a fellow human being, I feel deeply sorry for him.

Compared with Donald Trump—a con man who puts his own vanity above the interests of the United States, a habitual liar, fraudster and sexual predator—Biden is, by any reasonable standard, a decent man.

Being a decent person does not mean going through life without any moral failings. Take some of history’s most revered figures: Confucius, Gandhi, Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt, Mother Teresa. Bring them into the twenty-first century. Give everyone around them a smartphone and the ability to expose their misconduct instantly on social media. Strip away the institutions that once carefully protected their reputations and replace them with today’s ravenous, all-seeing media. We would undoubtedly discover plenty of ugly episodes: moments of selfishness, cruelty toward assistants or servants, misuse of official resources, jobs handed to relatives and friends, capable officials attacked or dismissed because of personal grudges. Then, they would no longer look quite so immaculate.

But there would still be a world of difference between these flawed human beings and men like Vladimir Trump and Vladimir Putin.

Confucius, Gandhi, Churchill, Roosevelt and Mother Teresa possessed a genuine sense of right and wrong, and a genuine sense of honour. They aspired to high moral standards. They wanted to be good, and wanted history to remember them as such. Most of the time, they tried to follow their consciences and put something larger than themselves—their country, their people, their cause—ahead of their own appetites.

Of course they sometimes failed. When self-interest entered the equation, desire could distort their judgement. A leader might convince himself that sending a military aircraft to pick up a friend for his birthday celebration was somehow justified. At other times, he might simply succumb to temptation and later feel ashamed of it.

Before the internet age, institutions were much better at hiding these human failings and preserving their immaculate public image.

In comparison, men like Vladimir Trump and Vladimir Putin are different in kind, not merely in degree.

They do not aspire to moral integrity at all. Moral integrity is simply not the standard by which they judge themselves. They know when they lie, cheat, abuse power for personal gain or prey upon others. They regard people capable of genuine self-denial and sacrifice as incomprehensible fools. Trump reportedly looked at the graves of American soldiers who had died for their country and said, “I don’t get it. These losers. What are they in for?"

To them, the ruthless pursuit of wealth, power, pleasure and personal glory is not a regrettable human weakness. It is how they believe the world is supposed to work.

In this fundamental respect, Biden belongs to the first category, not the second.

He has a conscience. He has a sense of right and wrong and a sense of honour. Throughout his life, he tried to restrain his own appetites, put his country above himself and do what he believed was right.

But the desire to do good is not enough to make a great statesman.

Great statesmanship also requires extraordinary judgement and insight.

History is littered with leaders who desperately wanted to do good but lacked the wisdom to understand the consequences of their actions. Such leaders can be far more destructive to a nation than a lazy, pleasure-seeking king.

Consider James I of England. He showered royal favour and titles upon his male lovers, lived extravagantly and perpetually struggled with royal finances, resorting to increasingly creative ways of raising money. Yet England remained prosperous under him.

His son Charles I was almost his moral opposite. Charles was personally disciplined, faithful to his wife and deeply religious. He sincerely wanted to serve God and his country. What he lacked was judgement. And the result was catastrophe: England was plunged into a devastating civil war, and Charles eventually lost his own head on the scaffold.

Biden suffers from the same fatal weakness: not wickedness, but a profound failure of political judgement. And after he became president, that weakness produced consequences for America and the world that were immense and, in some respects, disastrous.

When Biden first ran for president, he was already 78 years old. Faced with doubts both inside and outside the Democratic Party, he presented his mission as essentially one thing: defeating Donald Trump. At that moment, he was probably the Democrat best equipped to do it. He presented himself as a transitional figure—a man who would defeat Trump, serve his term, and then pass the torch to a younger generation.

But when the time came to let go, he could not. He succumbed to the seduction of the Ring of Power, reinforced by the ambitions of his wife, and insisted on running again. He was forced out only when the presidential debate made his decline impossible for the country to ignore.

By that point, there was barely enough time left to conduct a genuine Democratic contest for the nomination. Even so, the party might still have found a younger, energetic candidate with broad appeal who could take the fight to Trump.

Instead, Biden immediately threw his weight behind Kamala Harris, effectively foreclosing a competitive nomination process.

Harris then chose as her running mate a thoroughly mediocre politician who presented no danger of overshadowing her.

And then came one of the most astonishing acts of political incompetence of the entire campaign.

Harris was asked what she would have done differently from Biden.

This was perhaps the most predictable question imaginable. Yet, she paused long and said:

“There is nothing I can think of.”

Forget all her other mistakes. That answer alone was enough to end the Democrats’ chances of defeating Trump.

It was the political equivalent of walking into a job interview, being asked, “Why do you want to work for our company?”, thinking about it for a while, and answering: “I don’t know.”

It was an unforgivably elementary mistake.

Biden’s two disastrous decisions were certainly not the only reasons Donald Trump was able to return to power. But they were surely among the most important.

And in the two years since Trump’s return, America’s international prestige, strategic position and soft power have crumbled.

Biden cannot escape his share of responsibility for that outcome.

That is what makes his story so tragic.

Here was a politician who spent a lifetime trying to serve his country, restrain his own appetites and do what he believed was right. Yet at the very end of his career, when history demanded one final act of self-denial from him, he failed.

Sadly, for that reason, Joe Biden will go down history as a failure.

剛剛聽說拜登去日無多。作爲一個我的 fellow human being（人類同胞），我對他深表同情。

和人品惡臭、自己的虛榮心大於美國利益、滿嘴謊話、欺詐、性侵無惡不作的弗拉基米爾·川普相比，拜登是一個標準的體面人。

定義體面人的標準不是一生操守完美無瑕。歷史上標準的聖賢，比如孔子、甘地、丘吉爾、羅斯福、特蕾萨修女，把他們拉到今天，給他們周圍的人人手一部手機，隨時可以在社媒上揭發他們的醜聞，拿走當年小心維護他們形象的體制，換上今天無孔不入的嗜血媒體，你會發現，他們也有很多瑕疵，很多自私的時刻，比如對助手、僕人刻薄霸凌，因私使用公家的汽車或飛機，把職位給自己的親人朋友，因爲個人厭惡攻擊、罷免能幹的官員。

然而，這樣的不完美的政治家和弗拉基米爾·川普之間仍然有如天地之間的區別。

孔子、甘地、丘吉爾、羅斯福、特蕾萨修女心裏有鮮明的是非觀和榮譽觀，真心向往高尚的道德標準，真心希望自己能以聖賢載入史冊。在絕大多數情況下，他們能按照自己的良心行事，他們心裏的優先權是無私的國家、民族利益。在很少的情況下，當自己的利益和慾望牽扯其中，他們難免會自覺或不自覺地向私慾妥協，有時是是私慾扭曲了自己的判斷力，使他們真心相信派軍隊的飛機去接自己的好友來參加自己的生日拍拖是有道理的；在其他的情況下，他們對私慾讓步了，事後他們會爲此感到羞恥。互聯網出現前的體制會幫助他們隱藏個人瑕疵，對外呈現出完美的形象。

而弗拉基米爾·川普、弗拉基米爾·普京這樣的惡棍政治家們則根本不追求道德操守。他們知道自己欺詐、性侵、假公濟私、滿嘴謊話。他們認爲特蕾萨修女這樣的克己奉獻的人是不可理解的異類和蠢貨，比如川普在阿靈頓公募面對着陣亡英雄的墓碑說，“我不明白這些失敗者們究竟圖什麼？！” 他們認爲不擇手段地追求虛榮心的滿足和財富、權力、享樂才是人間正道。

拜登的心態和聖賢們無大異：他心裏有是非觀、榮譽觀，一生努力壓制自己的私慾，把國家民族利益置於個人之上，努力做好事。

但一個人能成爲聖賢，不僅需要做好人的決心，還需要有超人的洞察力和判斷力。古往今來，有強烈的做好事的衝動卻缺乏洞察力、判斷力的領袖是一個國家、民族最大的災難，他們造成的損害遠遠大於一個碌碌無爲貪圖享樂的國王。比如英國斯圖亞特王朝的詹姆士一世是個同性戀，給自己的一個個情人委以高爵，貪圖享樂，皇家預算常年不夠，不得不發明各種稅收，但英國在他的治下繁榮富足。他的兒子查爾斯一世嚴於律己，忠於妻子，是個虔敬的基督徒，立志爲神爲國家做好事，但洞察力、判斷力嚴重不足，結果英國陷入慘烈的十年內戰，自己被議會斬首。

拜登的洞察力、判斷力的缺陷，在他成爲總統後，給美國、世界造成了深遠的甚至是災難性的損害。在第一次競選總統時，他已經是78歲高齡，面對黨內黨外的質疑，他說他的唯一目的是擊敗川普（當時他是擊敗川普最好的人選），承諾自己只幹一屆，然後會將接力棒交給年富力強的接班人。然而，在下一屆競選時，他卻無法抵禦權力魔戒的誘惑和野心勃勃的妻子的影響，執意再選，直到四個月後在總統候選人辯論時出現明顯的老年癡呆的症狀，才被迫放棄。那時才重新開始民主黨內初選已經非常晚了，但即便如此，民主黨仍然可能選出衆望所歸的年富力強的候選人去挑戰川普。

但拜登又立即指定賀錦麗這個無能之輩爲總統候選人，跳過了民主黨的初選，賀錦麗又指定了一個對自己不會構成威脅的平庸之輩作爲自己的副總統人選。當被問道“你的政策和拜登有什麼區別”時，她竟然毫無準備，想了半天後回答，“我想不出會有任何區別”。不算她的其他錯誤，單單這一句話，就已經葬送了民主黨擊敗川普的希望。這就好像一個去面試的人被問，“你爲什麼想來我們公司工作”，他想了半天後回答“不知道”。這是個絕對無法原諒的超級低級的錯誤。

拜登的這二個錯誤決定，雖然不是弗拉基米爾·川普這個國賊竊國的唯一原因，但肯定是主要原因之一。國賊竊國後這二年，美國的國際威望、佈局、軟實力土崩瓦解，拜登對此負有不可推卸的責任。

非常遺憾，一個一生克己奉獻的政治家晚年不保，作爲歷史罪人載入史冊。

I have not written an in-depth analysis of the war in Ukraine for two years. It is now time to summarize my previous 43 articles in the series.

• Right up until the day before the war began, every Chinese political commentator said that Putin was merely playing an elaborate strategic game and would not actually invade. Two months before the war, in my December 19, 2021 article, “History Has Pushed Putin Onto the Path Once Taken by Hitler,” I said that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was highly probable. That prediction came true.
  
• Twenty-four days before the war, on January 31, 2022, I wrote in “Putin: A Desperado Strapped with Explosives, Storming a Bank to Demand Money”: “Most Chinese political commentators, whether pro- or anti-Communist, worship Putin. In my view, Putin belongs in the same category as Hitler and Hideki Tojo. He is one of the most incompetent strategists in history.” That prediction came true.
  
• Three days before the war, on February 21, 2022, I wrote in “Damned Either Way: The Chinese Communist Party’s Ukrainian Nightmare” that Putin had decided to launch a full-scale invasion. I based this conclusion on the disappearance from public view of all seven members of the Chinese Communist Party’s Politburo Standing Committee following Putin’s attendance at the opening ceremony of the Beijing Winter Olympics. That prediction came true.
  
• Just over a month after the war began, I predicted in “In-Depth Analysis of the War in Ukraine (9): The Future of the Tank,” published on April 1, 2022, that even the world’s most advanced tank, the US military’s M1A2, would be vulnerable to destruction once removed from the American system of combined-arms warfare. The tanks were subsequently destroyed repeatedly in Ukraine and demonstrated no particular advantage. That prediction came true.
  
• After Ukraine launched its so-called “great counteroffensive,” I repeatedly argued in several articles that the Ukrainian military lacked the courage to mount a large-scale offensive. War is like rowing against the current: if you do not advance, you retreat. Russia would exploit Ukraine’s inaction to prepare for another major offensive. Over the following year or two, Ukraine did indeed lose the initiative on the battlefield. Russian forces kept it under pressure and continued taking territory. That prediction came true.
  
• In “An Overview of the War in Ukraine, the Middle East, and the Taiwan Strait,” published on August 26, 2024, I predicted that regardless of how incompetent the Ukrainian military might be, Russia was incapable of stopping Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian oil-refining facilities. Because oil and gas exports were Russia’s only source of income capable of sustaining the war, “the outcome of the war in Ukraine has already been decided. There is no longer any uncertainty.” That prediction is now coming true.
  
• Two years ago, in August 2024, I wrote my most recent article in the series, “In-Depth Analysis of the War in Ukraine (43): Invading Kursk Is Not the Ultimate Objective.” At the time, political commentators everywhere were celebrating what they described as Ukraine’s masterful strategy: a feint in Kherson while its real objective was Kursk. I said Kursk was not Ukraine’s true objective and that the operation was not a good idea. Ukraine eventually lost Kursk completely after paying a terrible price. That prediction came true.

Ukraine’s Breakthrough in Its Conception of Warfare Is Winning It the Initiative

Today, the Ukrainian army is not noticeably different from what it was two years ago. It still lacks the courage and perseverance demonstrated by American troops on the beaches of Normandy and Okinawa—charging repeatedly through concentrated enemy fire and stepping over the overlapping bodies of their comrades. I examined this issue in depth in “In-Depth Analysis of the War in Ukraine (41): How Do You Build a Valiant Army?.”

Over the past two years, however, Ukraine has broken through a limit of imagination that no one else in the world—not even the US military—has overcome. By doing so, it has regained the initiative in the war.

Since the beginning of the Second World War, the US military has led the world in military technology. After the war ended, the technological gap between the United States and every other country grew increasingly wide. In the final major war before the invasion of Ukraine—the 1991 Gulf War—the United States used stealth aircraft, precision-guided weapons, satellite reconnaissance, electronic warfare, and an integrated air-ground combat system to deliver an overwhelming blow against Saddam Hussein’s battle-hardened Republican Guard, part of a total Iraqi force numbering nearly one million. The Iraqi military was completely defeated within a few short weeks. The United States suffered 148 combat deaths, while as many as 35,000 Iraqi soldiers were killed.

From then on, the world’s military strategists—including America’s—could not imagine, even after snorting cocaine, any way of strengthening a military other than continually improving its level of military technology.

This was the limit of imagination that the entire world had failed to overcome during the 70 years since the war.

Ukraine’s military technology is far inferior to Russia’s. Its national strength, industrial scale, and population are also far smaller.

Yet the Ukrainians were the first people in the world to break through this limit of imagination that nobody had overcome since the Second World War. They recognized that there is an extreme asymmetry between the difficulty of striking targets on the ground from the air and the difficulty of defending against those attacks from the ground—the former is a hundred times easier, while the latter is a hundred times harder. They realized that this extreme asymmetry could be used to win the war.

A country with third-rate military technology such as Ukraine cannot manufacture the US military’s hypersonic, ultra-precise ground-attack missiles. It cannot produce ballistic missiles comparable to the American technology of the 1960s, as China and Russia can. Nor can it produce Russia’s S-300 and S-400 air-defense missiles, whose boastful reputation reaches the sky but whose actual capabilities are comparable to American technology from the 1970s.

Nevertheless, Russia cannot easily shoot down the suicide drones that Ukraine manufactures on an enormous scale. These drones cost only a few thousand or tens of thousands of dollars each. They cannot fly high or fast, make a great deal of noise, have large heat signatures and radar returns, and are powered by lawnmower engines. Yet Russia’s S-300, S-400, Buk, Tor, and Sosna air-defense missiles—each costing millions of dollars—cannot easily destroy them.

Even if those missiles were capable of shooting down every Ukrainian drone, spending millions of dollars to destroy a drone worth only tens of thousands would still represent a complete victory for Ukraine in terms of cost. Russia cannot manufacture enough of these expensive missiles, while Ukraine can produce drones in virtually unlimited numbers.

It is not merely Russia. Even the US military cannot guarantee that it can shoot down such extremely primitive suicide drones. During the first round of the US-Iran war, most US military bases in the Middle East were destroyed by Iran’s rudimentary suicide drones and ballistic missiles. The equipment destroyed included four or five THAAD missile-radar systems, each costing billions of dollars and requiring four years to manufacture. The US military rapidly exhausted its supply of air-defense and cruise missiles costing millions or tens of millions of dollars each.

Iran depleted America’s stockpile of exorbitantly expensive munitions by absorbing its attacks. It then used bargain-basement drones to strike US forces effectively, seizing complete control of the initiative and trapping the United States in a dead end from which it could not escape. For details, see “The US-Iran War: A Complete American Defeat (II).”

Russia and the United States are now paying a terrible price for their failure to overcome this 70-year limit of imagination.

Ukraine has now created an extremely efficient, comprehensive system for drone research, development, and production, with hundreds or even thousands of independent drone developers and manufacturers. Only six or seven days pass between frontline soldiers identifying a change in battlefield conditions and requesting a new drone capability, and a drone meeting that requirement entering combat. In the United States, this cycle takes months or even years. Meanwhile, Russian corruption has made progress in drone technology painfully slow. A proxy company controlled by politically connected insiders monopolizes drone development, leaving frontline soldiers with unreliable, difficult-to-use drones that frequently malfunction.

By now, Ukrainian drones have destroyed more than 40 percent of Russia’s oil-refining capacity, and long lines are forming at petrol stations across the country. Selling oil and gas has been virtually Russia’s only source of income since the war began, yet Russia is now seeking to import petrol from India.

Ukrainian drones have cut the roads used to carry fuel and supplies into Crimea. They are methodically destroying the peninsula’s oil-storage and refining facilities and its power plants, rapidly turning Crimea into an isolated island on which survival is impossible.

After achieving significant results in those operations, Ukraine began systematically destroying the enormous logistics and distribution centers belonging to Wildberries. This highly successful and efficient Russian equivalent of Amazon is part of the Russian economy’s circulatory system and provides effective logistical support for Putin’s war. Russia’s deficit in the first quarter of 2026 alone was twice its total deficit for all of 2025.

The Ukrainian army, however, continues to defend fortified positions, while Russia continues feeding batch after batch of fresh troops into the Ukrainian meat grinder. Russia suffers more than 1,300 casualties every day, including more than 1,000 deaths. According to reliable intelligence from the Central Intelligence Agency, a Russian soldier sent to the front survives for an average of 23 minutes. By comparison, the average survival time of an American soldier in the European theater during the Second World War was between 420 and 600 days (ChatGPT)!

Seven hundred thousand Russian soldiers have been killed since the war began. If the war continues for another four years, Russian military deaths will exceed 2.7 million!

Russian frontline officers devote all their energy to extracting their soldiers’ generous allowances and deceiving their superiors. NATO’s intelligence apparatus has discovered that the Russian high command frequently bases its strategic planning on the assumption that Russia has captured areas that, in reality, remain under Ukrainian control.

This happens because Russian company- and battalion-level commanders frequently order soldiers to infiltrate Ukrainian-controlled territory, raise a Russian flag on a prominent building, record a video, and then withdraw. The commanders use these videos to claim credit and obtain rewards from their superiors, while the soldiers involved are frequently wiped out.

In this way, every level of the Russian military exploits those below it and deceives those above it. By the time the information reaches Putin, hiding in a bunker protected by layer after layer of defenses, he hears that everything on the front is proceeding according to plan and that victory is just over the horizon.

From the Perspective of Ukraine and NATO, This Situation Could Hardly Be More Perfect

If Putin knew the war’s true condition, he would probably abandon his completely unrealistic demand that Ukraine withdraw from vast areas of territory and agree to a ceasefire along the current front line.

Under pressure from Comrade Vladimir Trump, the FSB’s undercover agent, Ukraine would be forced to accept the ceasefire. Putin could then employ his formidable diplomatic skills and, with Comrade Trump’s cooperation, drag negotiations out for several years while securing a partial lifting of Western sanctions.

After several years, Russia would have restored its national strength and—with China’s cooperation—rebuilt a more advanced military. Putin would then return and attack again. This outcome would be virtually certain.

But today, the deception passed upward through every level of the Russian military has convinced Putin that he is winning. He therefore intends to continue the war.

And what will be the result?

In an article published on July 17, 2024, I wrote:

The inevitable result of this war is that Russia will exhaust itself, be reduced to a third-rate country, and withdraw from the stage of international politics. Only when the Russian people reach the following condition will they, like the Japanese people during the Second World War, realize that they have run headfirst into a brick wall:

Nine homes in ten stand empty; nine households in ten are bereaved.
Nine factories in ten are shuttered; nine shops in ten are stripped bare.
Nine armies in ten are routed; nine ships in ten are laid up.
Nine villages in ten are overgrown; nine cities in ten are desolate.

Unless its suffering reaches this level, the barbaric animal species known as Russia will never accept NATO’s position.

Judging by the current trend—a trend that can only continue to accelerate—the outcome described above is highly probable.

The current state of the war in Ukraine is precisely the state that every good person in the world wants to see.

The Next Stage of the War

The Ukrainian army will not remain indefinitely in its fortified defensive positions.

As Russia’s oil and gas resources are gradually exhausted and its economy continues to deteriorate; as its supply of military recruits steadily dries up; and as the flow of weapons, ammunition, and supplies to the front continues to decline, Russian morale will sink and its combat effectiveness will steadily weaken.

With NATO’s support, Ukraine’s intelligence system has a complete understanding of this process. Once a certain tipping point is reached, even Ukraine’s less-than-valiant army will be capable of launching an overwhelming offensive against Russia’s feeble forces.

The resulting transformation of the battlefield will remind us of the final year of the Chinese Civil War, when the attacking troops could run until their legs gave out and still fail to catch an enemy army that was disintegrating before them.

We are now in the quiet period before the great transformation.

我以往的烏戰預言

我二年沒有寫烏戰深度解析了。現在總結一下我以往的43篇烏戰深度解析：

• 一直到開戰前一天，所有華人政評人都說普京是在下大棋，不會真的入侵。在開戰前二個月，在2021年12月19日的《歷史將普京推上了希特勒曾走的那條路》一文裡我説，普京入侵烏克蘭是一個大概率事件。” 應驗。
  
• 在開戰前24天，2022年1月31日，在《普京：身綁炸藥衝進錢莊要錢的光棍》中我說：“華人政評人，不論親共反共，大多對普京頂禮膜拜。在我看來，普京和希特勒、東條英機一樣。是史上最蹩腳的戰略家。” 應驗。
  
• 在開戰前3天，2022年2月21日，在《橫竪都要倒霉：中共的烏克蘭噩夢》一文中，我根據普京出席北京東奧開幕式后中國七常委神隱判斷普京決定大規模入侵。應驗。
  
• 烏戰開戰後僅一個多月，我在2022年4月1日的《烏克蘭戰況深度解析（9）：坦克的未來》中預言，世界上最先進的美軍M1A2坦克離開了美軍的多兵種協作體系，照樣難逃被摧毀的命運。結果它在烏克蘭一再被擊毀，沒有表現出任何優勢。應驗。
  
• 在烏克蘭發動所謂“大反攻”後，我在我的多篇烏戰深度解析中一再指出，烏軍沒有發動大規模進攻的勇氣，戰爭如逆水行舟，不進則退，俄軍會利用烏軍的無所作為而為下一場大規模進攻做準備。結果，在後面的一二年裏，烏軍果然喪失了戰場主動權，被俄軍壓着打，不斷失地。應驗。
  
• 在2024年8月26日的《縱覽烏戰、中東、臺海》我預言：不論烏軍怎麼無能，因為俄軍無法阻止烏軍無人機對俄國煉油設施的打擊，而俄國油氣出口是維持其戰爭能力的唯一收入，“烏戰的結局也已決定。已經沒有任何懸念可言。” 正在應驗。
  
• 在二年前，2024年8月，我寫了最後一篇烏戰深度解析，《烏戰深度解析（43）：入侵庫爾斯克不是最終目的》。當時所有政評人都在歡呼烏軍用兵如神，在赫爾松佯攻，真正目標是庫爾斯克，我說這不是烏軍的目標，而且這不是好主意，結果烏軍在付出慘重代價後徹底失去庫爾斯克。應驗。

烏克蘭人在戰爭理念上的突破正在贏得戰爭的主動權

現在，烏克蘭陸軍和二年前沒有什麼明顯的改變。它仍然沒有美軍在諾曼底、沖繩的海灘上那種冒着敵人密集的火力，邁過戰友重疊的屍體，前仆後繼地衝鋒的勇氣和毅力。這一點我在《烏戰深度解析（41）：怎樣建立一隻驍勇的軍隊？》裏深入分析了。

但這二年來，烏克蘭突破了全世界包括美軍都沒有突破的一個想象力的侷限性，憑此重新贏得了烏戰的主動權。

自二戰開始，美軍就在軍事技術上領先全球，二戰結束後，美軍技術與其他所有國家之間的差距越來越大。在烏戰爆發前的最後一場大規模戰爭——1991年海湾战争中，美军凭借隐身战机、精确制导武器、卫星侦察、电子战和空地一体化作战体系，对萨达姆政权总兵力接近百万的久經戰陣的共和国卫队实施了压倒性打击，伊军在短短数周内被彻底击溃。美军148人战斗阵亡，而伊军阵亡高達3.5万人。

從此，全世界的軍事戰略家們，包括美國的，吸了白粉後也想像不出，要提升軍力，除了不斷提高軍事技術水平之外，還有任何其他的途徑。

這，就是全世界在戰後70年無法突破的想象力侷限。

烏克蘭的軍事科技水平遠遠低於俄國，國力、工業規模、人口也遠遠低於俄國。

但烏克蘭人在全世界最先突破了這個二戰以來無人突破的想象力侷限。他們意識到，空對地打擊的難度和地對空防守的難度之間有極度的不對稱性——前者比後者容易百倍，後者比前者難百倍。他們意識到，可以利用這個極度不對稱性贏得戰爭。

烏克蘭這樣的三流軍事科技造不出美軍的超高音速、超高精度的對地打擊導彈，造不出中俄的相當於美軍60年代水平的彈道導彈，也造不出俄軍的牛皮比天高但實際上相當於美軍70年代水平的S300、S400防空導彈。

然而，烏軍超大規模生產的、幾千、幾萬美元一架的、飛不高、飛不快、噪音大、熱特徵大、雷達回波大、割草機引擎驅動的自殺無人機，俄軍的幾百萬美元一枚的S300、S400、山毛櫸、道爾、松樹防空導彈卻無法輕易擊落。而且，即使這些導彈有能力百分百地擊落烏軍的無人機，這種用幾百萬美元擊落幾萬美元的價格交換比，也是烏軍的完全勝利。俄羅斯造不起這麼多昂貴的導彈，而烏軍的無人機要多少有多少。

不要說俄軍，就連美軍都無法保證擊落這種再落後不過的自殺無人機。在第一回合的美伊戰爭中，美軍在中東的大部分軍事基地都被伊朗的再落後不過的自殺無人機和彈道導彈摧毀，包括四五套幾十億美元一套、需要四年才能生產出來的薩德導彈雷達系統。美軍的幾百萬、幾千萬美元一枚的防空和巡航導彈迅速消耗殆盡。伊朗靠挨打耗盡了美國的天價彈藥庫存，然後用白菜價的無人機對美軍進行有效的打擊，完全掌握了戰爭的主動權，美國陷入了無法脫身的死局。詳情見《美伊戰爭：美國完敗（II）》。

俄國、美軍正在爲這個戰後70年裏無法突破的想象力侷限付出慘重代價。

現在，烏克蘭已經形成了一整套無人機研發生產的極其高效的體系，有成百上千的獨立的無人機研發和製造企業。從前線士兵發現戰場形勢變化，提出對無人機的新要求，到滿足新要求的無人機參戰，中間只間隔六七天。在美國，這個週期是幾個月甚至幾年，而俄國的腐敗使得俄軍在無人機技術上步履維艱，一個權貴的白手套公司壟斷了無人機的研發，前線士兵獲得的無人機不好用，故障率高。

到現在，烏軍的無人機已經摧毀了40%以上的俄國煉油能力，俄國各地加油站紛紛排起長隊。賣油氣是開戰以來俄國幾乎唯一的收入來源，但現在俄國已經要求向印度進口汽油。烏軍的無人機切斷了向克里米亞輸入燃料和給養的公路，正在一個個摧毀克里米亞的石油儲存、冶煉設施、發電廠，使克里米亞半島迅速變成一個無法生存的孤島。在上述行動取得顯著成果後，烏軍開始一個個摧毀俄國的野莓公司（Wild Berry）的巨大的物流配送中心。這個非常成功高效的俄國亞馬遜是俄國經濟的供血系統，是普京戰爭的高效的後勤保障系統。2026年第一季度俄國的赤字就是2025年全年赤字的的二倍。

但烏克蘭的陸軍仍然在據險防守，而俄軍仍然不斷向烏克蘭絞肉機裏投入一批批生力軍，每天傷亡1300人以上，其中1000以上人陣亡。根據中央情報局的可靠情報，一個俄軍士兵投入前線後的平均生存時間是23分鐘，而二戰期間美軍士兵在歐洲戰場上的平均生存時間在420天到600天之間（ChatGPT）！

開戰以來，70萬俄軍陣亡。再打四年，俄軍陣亡人數將超過270萬！

俄軍前線軍官的全部精力都用來榨乾基層士兵的高額津貼和欺騙上級。北約情報結構發現，俄軍統帥部的戰略佈局經常建立在俄軍已經佔領了某些實際上仍由烏軍控制的地區的假設上，因爲俄軍連級、營級指揮官經常會讓士兵潛入烏軍控制區，在地標性建築上升起俄國旗，拍個視頻，然後就撤退，以此向上級邀功請賞，而這些士兵經常全軍覆沒。

就這樣，俄軍一級級地向下壓榨，向上欺騙，到了躲在層層防守的地堡裏的普京耳朵裏，就是前線戰況一切按計劃進行，勝利的曙光就在前頭。

這個狀態，在烏克蘭和北約眼裏，實在完美無比

如果普京知道戰爭的實際狀態，那麼他很可能放棄要求烏軍撤出大片領土的完全不切實際的要求，同意在現有戰線上實現停火。在FSB臥底弗拉基米爾·川普同志的施壓之下，烏克蘭將被迫同意停火。然後，普京就可以施展其高超的外交手腕，在川普同志的配合下，將談判拖上好幾年，同時讓西方部分解除制裁。幾年後，俄國恢復了國力，在中國的配合下重建更加先進的軍力，然後普京會捲土重來。這個結局將是板上釘釘的事。

但現在，俄軍的一級級向上欺騙使得普京以爲他在贏，所以他要將戰爭繼續下去。

結果呢？

在2024年7月17日的文章中我說：

這場戰爭的結果，一定是俄國油盡燈枯，降級為一個三流國家，退出國際政治的舞台。俄國老百姓們只有到了下面地步，才會像二戰中的日本人民一樣，認識到自己撞了南墻：

十室九空，十戶九殤。
十廠九閉，十店九光。
十軍九潰，十舟九宕。
十村九蕪，十城九荒。

不慘到這個地步，俄羅斯這隻野蠻的牲口物種絕不會接受北約的這個立場。

按照現在的趨勢——這個趨勢只可能持續加速——上面的結局是大概率事件。

現在的烏戰狀態，是全世界的好人都喜歡的狀態。

烏戰的下一個階段

但烏克蘭陸軍的據險防守不會無限期繼續下去。

隨着俄國油氣資源的逐漸枯竭和俄國經濟不斷惡化，隨着俄軍兵源日漸枯竭，隨着前線武器彈藥和給養供應不斷減少，俄軍的士氣會日漸低落，戰鬥力持續下降。烏克蘭在北約支持下的情報系統對這個變化過程瞭如指掌。到了莫個臨界點，烏克蘭的並不驍勇的陸軍就有能力對弱不禁風的俄軍發起摧枯拉朽的進攻。那時戰局的變化會讓我們想起中國內戰最後一年的戰場態勢——進攻方跑斷了腿都追不上土崩瓦解的敵軍。

現在，是大變之前的安靜期。