Why Was the Iraq War Justifiable, but Not the Iran War?

The Iraq war was justified

Everyone now agrees the 2003 invasion of Iraq was a mistake — left and right, hawk and dove. Dodgy intelligence, no weapons of mass destruction, a botched occupation, trillions spent, and above all the birth of ISIS.

I don’t dispute any of those facts. I dispute the verdict drawn from them, because that verdict is a snapshot mistaken for a conclusion. Run the clock from 2003 to today and judge the whole span of 23 years as a single event, and the net effect is very positive in comparison with the alternative: Saddam’s son Uday ruling Iraq today.

Start with the choice America actually faced, because critics always smuggle in a fantasy version of 2003 in which doing nothing was free and safe. It was neither.

Saddam had already invaded Kuwait. And after he was driven out, he did not become a quiet neighbour. He kept the Republican Guard massed along the Kuwaiti and Saudi borders. The US had to station roughly a hundred thousand troops in the region indefinitely, alongside no-fly zones that demanded a permanent air presence sustained by six thousand airmen. That is not peace. It is a siege with no end date and a vast standing cost. So the US had to end it.

It was never America’s plan — but the shattering of the Iraqi state opened a vacuum, and that vacuum acted as a magnet. It drew the hardline jihadist vanguard, from across the region and the wider world, into one place, in the open, where they were fought and destroyed — rather than left to fester in a hundred ungoverned corners. The caliphate was built, declared to the world as the great hope, and then ground into rubble in front of everyone.

Consequently, outside the irreducible fringe of fanatics, ordinary Muslims today look at violent extremism and see no future in it. That is a safer world. That is the huge benefit we are enjoying today.

The fall of Saddam in 2003 was the first move in a long unwinding. It removed an anchor of the region’s authoritarian bloc, and it opened two decades in which the strongmen and the theocrats steadily lost ground. Assad’s Syria did not survive that long arc. Iran reached the end of it isolated and alone — exposed enough that Israel and the United States could strike it more or less at will.

I am not claiming the Iraq War alone caused all of this; the Arab Spring and Syria’s own collapse had engines of their own. But Iraq was the enabling first domino. With Uday still standing today, it is not a stretch to think that Iraq and Iran — two old foes facing a common enemy in the US and Israel — might have closed ranks into some kind of alliance. With that bloc in place, it is very hard to see the chain ever beginning.

The reason America won this long war was due to two characteristics she used to possess: she was ideologically stubborn — she believed in the ideals she advocated — and she was rich and powerful enough to absorb a colossal error and come back to finish the job.

So yes — the cost in lives across these 23 years was enormous, and I won’t wave it away. But “it was costly" is not the same sentence as “it was a mistake." For the same reason, we don’t blame the UK and France for the massive loss of life in WWII simply because they declared war on Hitler.

The Iran war is not

Now, can you see why one could argue the Iraq War was justified, yet not be able to say the same of the current war with Iran?

Because the US no longer possesses either of the two characteristics that let her pull off a final victory through the many battles of that prolonged Iraq War over the last 20 years.

When it fought Saddam and ISIS, the US had unequivocal backing from all her allies — moral at the very least, and in many cases financial and military as well.

Today, America has abandoned all of her lofty ideals. She has lost all moral scruple — willing to backstab her most loyal, oldest friends for financial gain. None of her erstwhile allies wants anything to do with her war on Iran. I say erstwhile because I would argue that, even if many of them will not say it aloud, all her old allies despise her and have lost faith in her — not just because of a vile demagogue, but even more because of the majority of Americans who put him in office. I know the moron put up a brave face and said America doesn’t need any allies. Such immaturity is not worth rebuking.

Today the US’s debt is around 120% of GDP. It has sat above the size of the entire economy for more than a decade now, and is closing on — by some measures already past — the record she set winning two massive wars in Europe and Asia. And she has let it climb that high without yet firing a single shot in the war now looming over the Taiwan Strait.

Unlike the last time the US went to war in Iraq, this time everybody warned the administration that it would not work — including the Joint Chiefs of Staff he had hand-picked — but he went for the thrill ride anyway.

The result: Iran’s military strength is recovering fast, and her gain is enormous — control of the Strait of Hormuz.

America did not just fail to learn anything over the last 23 years — populism is making her a great deal dumber.

為什麼伊拉克戰爭是正確的決定,伊朗戰爭卻不是?

伊拉克戰爭是正確的決定

如今,無論左派右派、鷹派鴿派都同意,2003 年入侵伊拉克是個錯誤。情報靠不住、根本沒有大規模毀滅性武器、佔領搞得一團糟、花掉數以兆計的美元,而最重要的是,催生了伊斯蘭國(ISIS)。

這些事實我一概不否認。我要質疑的,是由這些事實推導出來的結論。把時鐘從 2003 年一路撥到今天,把這整整 23 年當作單一事件來評斷,那麼相較於另一種結局——海珊之子烏代如今仍統治著伊拉克,這23年的戰爭的淨效果其實非常正面。

先從美國當年真正面對的選擇談起,因為批評者總是拿出一個幻想版本的 2003 年,彷彿什麼都不做既沒有代價、又很安全。事實上兩者皆非。

海珊早已入侵過科威特。被趕出去之後,他並沒有就此變成一個安分的鄰居。他依舊把共和國衛隊重兵屯駐在科威特與沙烏地的邊境上。美國因此不得不在該地區無限期駐紮約十萬大軍,並維持禁飛區——而這需要六千名空軍人員長期支撐起一支常駐空中武力。這不是和平,而是一場沒有終點、且需付出龐大常態成本的圍困。美國必須結束這場對峙。

雖然不是美國的本意——但伊拉克國家機器的崩解打開了一個權力真空,而那個真空就像一塊磁鐵。它把來自整個地區乃至全世界的激進聖戰急先鋒,全都吸引到同一個地方,在那裡被迎頭痛擊、徹底殲滅——而不是任由他們在無數無人管理的角落裡潰爛蔓延。激進伊斯蘭主義作為一種群眾性的理想,已被掏空。哈里發國被建立起來、向全世界宣告為偉大的希望,然後當著眾人的面被碾成瓦礫。於是,除了那一小撮無論如何都消除不掉的狂熱份子之外,今天的普通穆斯林在暴力極端主義上已看不到任何前途。

這是一個更安全的世界。

這正是我們今天所享有的巨大紅利。

2003 年海珊的垮台,是一場漫長鬆動的第一步:它拔掉了該地區威權陣營的一根定錨,並開啟了往後二十年——在這二十年裡,強人與神權統治者節節敗退。阿薩德的敘利亞沒能撐過這道漫長的弧線。伊朗則走到這道弧線的盡頭,孤立無援——脆弱到以色列與美國幾乎可以隨時對它出手。

我並不是說這一切全由伊拉克戰爭一手造成;阿拉伯之春與敘利亞本身的崩潰,各有其自身的動力。但伊拉克是那塊啟動連鎖反應的第一張骨牌。倘若烏代今天依然屹立,那麼不難想像:伊拉克與伊朗這兩個宿敵,在面對美國與以色列這個共同敵人時,很可能會捐棄前嫌、結成某種同盟。一旦這樣的集團成形,那整條連鎖反應幾乎不可能啟動。

不錯,這 23 年間付出的人命代價極其慘重,我不會把它輕描淡寫地揮開。但「代價高昂」並不等於「這是個錯誤」。同樣道理,我們並不會因為英國與法國向希特勒宣戰,就把二戰中那慘重的傷亡歸咎於它們。

場23年的戰爭之所以勝利,靠的是美國昔日曾經具備的兩項特質:她在意識形態上極為執拗——她真心相信自己所鼓吹的理念;而且她足夠富強,足以承受一個天大的錯誤,再回過頭來把事情做完。

伊朗戰爭不是正確的決定

那麼,你現在能看出來,為什麼我們主張伊拉克戰爭打得有理,卻無法替當前這場對伊朗的戰爭說同樣的話嗎?

因為美國已不再具備那兩項特質中的任何一項。

當年對付海珊與伊斯蘭國時,美國得到所有盟友毫不含糊的支持——至少是道義上的支持,許多時候更包括財政與軍事上的支援。

如今,她已經完全拋棄了她昔日的所有高尚的理想。她現在是一個唯利是圖、不擇手段的賭徒。昔日的盟友沒有一個願意沾上她這場對伊朗的戰爭。我之所以說「昔日」,是因為即便他們當中許多人不願把話挑明,她所有的老盟友其實都鄙視她、對她失去了信任——這不僅僅是因為一個卑劣的煽動家,更是因為那些把他送進白宮的多數美國人。我知道那個蠢貨擺出一副無所謂的姿態,說什麼美國根本不需要盟友。如此幼稚,根本不值得我去反駁。

今天,美國的債務約為 GDP 的 120%。它已經連續十幾年高過整個經濟體的規模,如今正逼近——以某些口徑來算甚至已經超越——她當年打贏歐亞兩場大戰時所創下的紀錄。而現在她是在那場正籠罩台灣海峽的即將到來的世界大戰中一槍未放,就把債務推到了這麼高的水位。

與上一次美國出兵伊拉克時不同,這一回,所有人都警告過政府這行不通——連他親自欽點的參謀首長聯席會議都在內——但他還是執意去享受這場刺激的冒險。

結果呢:伊朗的軍事實力正在迅速恢復,而她的收穫極為龐大——掌控了荷莫茲海峽。

美國在過去 23 年裡,不只是什麼都沒學到——它變得越來越蠢。

America’s Decline — and Why I Still Have Hope

You can tell me 100 reasons why you do not like the United States, and they can all be legitimate. But then I will tell you that, in the past 30 years, most if not all democracy and human rights advocates whom the CCP jailed and then was pressured to free — the pressure came from the US, and they were given asylum in the US.

With all her controversies and impurities — she supported the Shah of Iran, the dictator and murderer Pinochet, and many other brutal regimes across Latin America, Asia, and Africa — it is still not a far stretch to say that the US was often viewed by the rest of the world as a model of governmental moral standards, due process, tolerance of dissent, and hope for the oppressed.

The intent of the US in those days was different from today. She was facing off against a gigantic opponent, the Soviet Union; she could not afford to alienate every country that was not democratic — she would lose that fight, and the end result would be 100 times worse than her compromise. By gaining as many allies as possible via the compromises, her intent was first to protect democracy within her borders, then to advance it in the rest of the world. She fell short of those ideals constantly, but she held them as ideals — and that was no small thing.

What I see today is a country in a downward spiral so steep and so visible that it is impossible to dismiss as cyclical politics.

Internally, the administration shoots dead innocent protesters then claims they are terrorists, conducts raids that resemble organised cruelty more than law enforcement, and treats criticism — including from longtime allies — as personal insult to be revenged at all costs. The president and his family do not even hide the fact that they are raking in billions in all kinds of shady power-money deals. The Fed, which had remained independent for more than a hundred years, is being brutally and shamelessly attacked. The institutions that protected tolerance and dissent are being deliberately weakened.

Externally, the country that once at least pretended to champion liberal values now openly murders alleged drug traffickers on the high seas, without trial and without evidence. The goal is no longer to advance democracy and human rights, but pure transactional and selfish power wielded via coercion in zero-sum games.

In the past, the US fell short of the lofty ideals constantly, but she was trying. What is different now is that the ideals themselves have been abandoned.

This is not the mask slipping. This is the mask being thrown away.

What broke

The deeper question is why. And here I think the answer is structural, not personal. Trump is a symptom, not a cause. The root cause is that social media wrestled control of the narrative away from the elite class and gave it to the masses.

Before social media, the elite — through mainstream media, universities, publishing, broadcast journalism — owned the narration of public life. They decided what was discussed, what the moral standard was, what direction the country was heading. The masses had votes, but the framing of choices, the boundaries of acceptable discourse, the slow shaping of public opinion — those were elite functions.

But now, the angry mob controls the narrative, and they put a destructive demagogue in office.

I am not naive about who the elite were. They were self-interested. They made decisions that benefited themselves disproportionately. The financial deregulation that hollowed out working-class stability, the trade policies that accelerated deindustrialisation, the regulatory capture that protected incumbents — all of that was elite work, and the cost was carried by people far below them. Elites were never saints. That much I take as given.

But here is the comparative point that matters. The self-interested elites know that

  • Their interest is maximized in the long term if their country is strong and prosperous.
  • Their country is strong internationally when its allies trust it.
  • Seeking common ground and mutual benefits in a respectful manner wins trust and achieves bigger long-term self-interest.
  • Domestically, democracy, equality, and tolerance of dissent produce the most vibrant economy.

In other words, a well-educated and less angry elite class understand that, to a large extent, the nation’s interest is aligned with their own, that killing the chicken that lay gold eggs is not how they advance their own interest.

So, the elites are not perfect, but they kept the US the leader of the free world in the last hundred years.

Compare that to what happens when the angry mob takes the wheel. The masses, given control of the narrative, do not patiently work through long-term solutions. They are angry, often legitimately so, but anger does not produce policy. It produces scapegoating. It produces the search for someone to blame and punish. And it produces demagogues — figures who say anything to ride the anger to power, who do not give a damn about the people whose pain elected them.

Trump is the textbook example. He does not care about the working class – he just openly admitted that. He never has. He weaponises their grievances, but his actual policies — tariffs, immigration crackdowns, attacks on institutions — do nothing to address the underlying economic dislocation his voters are experiencing. He is more selfish than the elites, but more fatally, he is more shortsighted than the elites he displaced. That makes him hundred times more destructive.

This is the comparative judgement at the core of my view: a self-interested elite class controlling the narrative is the lesser evil — by a wide margin — compared to an angry mob being led by destructive demagogues. The former is imperfect and frustrating. The latter is catastrophic.

The algorithm amplifies the worst voices

Social media did not merely give ordinary people a voice. That framing is too generous. Social media gave the angriest voices the loudest megaphone, because algorithmic engagement is driven by rage, fear, and outrage. The system does not surface the thoughtful or the moderate. It surfaces what provokes reaction. So what we see when “the masses speak" is not the average citizen. It is the most enraged tail of the distribution, amplified far beyond its actual share of public opinion, and then mistaken for the public itself.

This matters because it means the populist energy driving Western politics today is not a clean signal of democratic preference. It is a distorted signal — real grievances filtered through an outrage machine that rewards extremity and punishes nuance. The elite did not lose the narrative to “the people" in any romantic democratic sense. The elite lost the narrative to an algorithmic amplification of the angriest fraction of the people.

Democrats failed, but they did not cause this

The economic pain underlying populism is real, and it is not the fault of any particular administration. The US is going through a transition comparable to the industrial revolution. Low-tech manufacturing — clothing, steel, washing machines — built the American middle class in the twentieth century. That manufacturing no longer makes money in the US. This is not a political choice. It is a structural reality, and it has produced enormous pain in the communities that depended on it.

So I do not blame Democrats for the underlying transition. That would be like blaming the weather. What I do blame them for is failing in their duty to acknowledge and manage that pain. They governed as if the economy were fine because the parts of it they inhabited were fine. They offered technocratic optimism to people whose lives were materially worse than their parents’ lives, and they wondered why those people stopped trusting them.

Trump did not solve the problem. His policies make it worse. But he at least validated the pain — and validation matters in politics in a way the educated class consistently underestimates. People will tolerate being lied to about solutions before they will tolerate being told their suffering is imaginary.

That failure created the opening. Once a populist movement finds a leader who acknowledges the pain — even falsely — the establishment cannot easily win those voters back, because the trust is broken.

What real conservatism looks like

I call myself a conservative, and I want to be precise about what I mean by that, because Trump and the Republican Party today are not conservative in any meaningful sense. They are radicals dressed in conservative clothing.

A conservative, in the proper sense, believes that society should not be forced into a particular shape by brute force. Society is like a body. When a constraint is warping it — like the Corn Laws in nineteenth-century Britain, which originally had a good purpose but had become a painful distortion — the right response is to remove the constraint and let the society adjust naturally. Repealing the Corn Laws was a conservative change in the proper sense: identifying that a law was bending the spine and removing it, so the body could straighten itself.

Trump’s tariffs are the opposite. They are a hammer. They are an attempt to use brute political force to bend the American economy back into a shape it has already grown out of. That is not conservatism. That is radicalism. Forcing a spine to bend by external pressure does not heal it. It breaks it.

A genuinely conservative response to the deindustrialisation of America would not be tariffs and scapegoating. It would be the patient work of removing the constraints that prevent people and communities from adapting: dismantling regulatory capture that protects incumbent industries at the expense of new ones, opening up education and labour mobility, investing in the kind of infrastructure that lets struggling regions retool. That is slow and undramatic work. It does not win elections, because it offers no enemy to blame and no quick fix to promise. But it is the only response that actually addresses the problem without doing more damage.

Neither major American party is currently doing this work. The Republicans are imposing tariffs. The Democrats are protecting incumbent regulatory structures and offering identity-driven messaging instead of structural reform. Both are choosing to impose solutions rather than remove constraints. That is why I see almost no genuine conservatism in mainstream American politics today.

The threshold

Here is the part that worries me most. Once the downward spiral passes a certain threshold, the cycle becomes self-reinforcing and very difficult to reverse:

  • The angry mob tends to adore strong man and despise weak-looking politicians that chase democratic ballots.
  • They do not understand that the opposition party and free media criticism exist to keep the system healthy; instead, they view them as enemies.
  • They do not understand that their leader first has to have basic integrity and conviction. Otherwise, no matter how smart and capable he is, as soon as he is in power, he will pursue his own interest at the expense of the people. Instead, the mob always want “their man” to be a strong man without opposition, and they can tolerate him to commit fraud, rape, and coup against legitimate election result.
  • Thus, their strongman will work with their blessing to remove the checks and balances, first from individual endeavors, then from the institution.
  • He will also immediately work, again with the mob’s blessing, on suppression of the “fake news”, so that his mob can be fed with what he wants to feed them, and there is no more independent media which tells the truth.

Once the last step is achieved, there is no going back.

I do not think the US or the United Kingdom have crossed it. But I think both are uncomfortably going down that path, and that is the heart of my worry.

Hungary gives me some hope. Under Orbán, Hungarian democracy backslid significantly. I assumed at the time that Hungary had passed the threshold and entered the self-reinforcing phase. I was wrong. The Hungarian people retained enough capacity to push back, and the democratic correction came. So the threshold is real, but it is further away than I sometimes fear, and democratic resilience is robust enough.

Still, resilience is not invincibility. Hungary’s institutions were younger and shallower than America’s or Britain’s. That cuts both ways: it took less to damage them, but perhaps also less to restore. The American case may be different — once broken – it is already in a very bad shape – it may be more difficult to revert.

America may wake up. Britain worries me more.

Looking at the current moment, I see America bleeding support for Trumpism across nearly every demographic that previously sustained it. His coalition is fraying. There is a real chance the midterm elections deliver a serious rebuke and that the country begins the slow work of pulling back from the edge. I am not blindly optimistic — Trump’s support has been more durable than pundits keep expecting, and even if he personally is rejected, the conditions that produced him are still there.

But the possibility of correction in the US is real.

The United Kingdom worries me more. Britain has watched the American experience unfold in real time. The damage Trump has done to American institutions, the moral degradation of American foreign policy, the alienation of allies, the assault on basic democratic norms — none of this has been hidden from British observers. And yet, against this backdrop, Britain has elevated Nigel Farage’s Reform UK to arguably the most powerful political force in the country.

This is the part that genuinely frightens me.  The fact that Britain is choosing its own Trump suggests that the populist dynamic is not Trump-specific. It is structural. The same forces — economic dislocation, elite dismissal of working-class pain, algorithmic amplification of anger, the failure of mainstream parties to offer genuine conservative correction — are producing the same outcome in country after country, regardless of whether the previous example ended well.

If this is right, then “wait for America to course-correct and the wave will pass" is the wrong frame.

The tide is not American. America was simply the first wave. Britain is the next. There will be others. And each country that crosses the threshold makes the international order more dangerous for the ones that have not.

What I am, in the end

I am a conservative who believes in democracy, in due process, in patient organic adjustment, in the removal of distortions rather than the imposition of solutions. I am not optimistic about the next decade in the West, but I am not yet despairing. Hungary taught me that democratic resilience is real. America still has functioning courts, a free if fragmented press, and electoral competition that has not yet been captured. Britain has even deeper institutions. The threshold is real, but neither country has crossed it.

What I want, more than anything, is for the elite classes of these countries to relearn the basic lesson Democrats failed: that you cannot govern a country by dismissing the pain of the people you govern. The economic transition is real and largely unavoidable. The pain it produces is real and demands acknowledgement. A genuine conservatism — patient, structural, focused on removing the constraints that prevent adaptation — is the only honest response. Tariffs are not it. Scapegoats are not it. Demagogues are not it. And dismissive technocracy is not it either.

I am hopeful and worried at the same time.

再談美國的墮落——和希望

【本文是我先寫的英文再由AI翻譯成中文,所以文風和我以往略有不同】

你可以列出一百個不喜歡美國的理由,而且很多都成立。但我會告訴你:過去三十年裡,中共關押後又被迫釋放的大部分民主與人權人士,施壓者都是美國,而最終收留他們的,也是美國。

美國當然不完美。她支持過伊朗國王、皮諾契特,以及拉丁美洲、亞洲、非洲許多殘暴政權。但即使如此,在很長時間裡,世界仍把美國視為法治、程序正義、容忍異議,以及受壓迫者希望的象徵。

當年的美國,與今天不同。面對強敵蘇聯,她不能因為其他國家不夠民主就與之為敵。否則她會輸,而結果只會更糟。因此,她選擇妥協、拉攏盟友。她首先要保住自身的民主制度,再慢慢推進世界上的自由價值。雖然她不斷違背自己的理想,但至少,她仍把那些理想視為理想。這一點很重要。

而今天,我看到的是一個正在急速下墜的國家。速度快到已經無法再被解釋成普通的政治循環。

在國內,政府射殺抗議者,然後稱他們是恐怖分子;執法行動愈來愈像有組織的殘酷,而不是法治;對批評者——甚至老盟友——也以為個人羞辱,並動用國家力量報復。總統與其家族幾乎毫不掩飾地利用權力牟取巨額利益。維持百年獨立性的聯準會,也被公開而粗暴地攻擊。那些曾保護異議與寬容的制度,正在被刻意削弱。

在國際上,那個至少曾「假裝」捍衛自由價值的國家,如今愈來愈赤裸地以利益與威嚇行事。目標已不再是推進民主與人權,而是通過與脅迫來損人利己。

過去的美國,雖然經常辜負理想,但至少總在嘗試。今天不同的是,理想本身已經被放棄。

這不再是面具滑落。這是直接把面具扔掉。

問題在哪裡?

更深層的問題是:為什麼?我認為答案是結構性的,而不是個人的。川普是症狀,不是病因。真正的根源,是社交媒體把敘事權從精英手中奪走,交給了群眾。

在社交媒體出現前,精英透過主流媒體、大學、出版業與新聞體系,掌握公共生活的敘事權。他們決定什麼值得討論、什麼算道德標準、國家應往哪裡走。人民當然有選票,但議題如何被框架、言論邊界如何被定義、輿論如何被長期塑造——這些都掌握在精英手裡。

我並不天真。我知道那些精英並不高尚。他們同樣追逐自身利益。金融鬆綁掏空工人階級的穩定生活;自由貿易加速去工業化;監管俘虜保護既得利益者——這些都出自精英之手,而代價則由下層人民承受。精英從來不是聖人。這點我從不否認。

但真正重要的是比較。自利的精英至少明白:

  • 他們的長期利益,建立在國家強盛與繁榮之上。
  • 而一個國家若想在國際上強大,就需要盟友的信任。
  • 以尊重的方式尋求共同利益,能換來更大的長期利益。
  • 在國內,民主、平等與容忍異議,能創造最有活力的經濟。

換句話說,受過良好教育、沒那麼憤怒的精英,至少理解:國家的利益,在很大程度上與自己的利益一致。把會下金蛋的雞殺掉,並不能真正讓自己獲利。

所以精英雖不完美,但過去一百年裡,他們仍讓美國成為自由世界的領導者。

但現在,憤怒的群眾通過社媒掌握了敘事權,讓後把一個破壞性的煽動者送上台。群眾的憤怒即使有理,也不會耐心處理長期問題。憤怒不會產生政策。它只會產生替罪羊。它會催生煽動者——那些為了權力,什麼都敢說的人。他們根本不在乎那些把自己送上台的人。

川普就是最典型的例子。他根本不在乎工人階級——甚至已經親口承認。他從來沒有在乎過。他只是把人民的不滿當成武器。而他的政策——關稅、移民打壓、攻擊制度——並沒有解決支持者真正面對的經濟問題。

他比舊精英更自私。更致命的是,他比那些被他取代的精英更短視。因此,他的破壞力大得多。

這就是我核心的判斷:由自利精英掌控敘事,雖然不完美,但仍遠遠好過由憤怒群眾在煽動者帶領下掌控國家。前者令人失望。後者則是災難。

算法放大最糟糕的聲音

社交媒體不只是讓普通人有了發聲權。這種說法太美化了。

社交媒體真正做的,是讓最憤怒的人獲得最大的擴音器。因為演算法靠憤怒、恐懼與仇恨來提升互動。

它不會放大理性與溫和。它只會放大能刺激情緒的內容。

所以今天我們看到的「人民的聲音」,其實並不是普通公民的平均意見。而是最憤怒那部分人,被演算法無限放大後,錯誤地被當成了整體民意。

這點非常重要。

因為今天西方的民粹浪潮,並不是純粹的民主意志。它是一種被扭曲後的訊號——真實的不滿,被一套以憤怒為燃料的系統加工後,再推到整個社會面前。

精英並不是把敘事權輸給了「人民」。而是輸給了演算法放大的憤怒。

民主黨失敗了,但民主黨不是問題的根源

民粹背後的經濟痛苦是真實的,而且並不是哪一屆政府單獨造成的。美國正經歷一場接近工業革命級別的轉型。過去建立美國中產階級的低技術製造業——服裝、鋼鐵、家電——如今已無法在美國維持高利潤。這不是政治選擇,而是結構現實。而它摧毀了大量依賴這些產業的社區。

我不怪民主黨造成了這場轉型。那就像怪罪天氣一樣荒謬。我責怪的是:他們沒有正視這種痛苦,也沒有妥善處理。他們像經濟一切正常般執政,因為他們自己所在的階層過得很好。他們對那些生活不如父母的一代人,持續輸出 technocratic optimism(技術官僚式樂觀),然後還驚訝人民為何不再信任他們。

川普沒有解決問題。他的政策甚至讓問題更糟。但他至少承認了人民的痛苦。

而政治裡,有一件事受過教育的階層總是低估:人們寧願接受錯誤答案,也不願被告知自己的痛苦不存在。

這種失敗,才真正打開了民粹的大門。

當一場民粹運動出現一個願意「承認痛苦」的領袖後,即使他是假的,建制派也很難再把選民拉回來。因為信任已經破裂。

真正的保守主義是什麼

我稱自己為保守派,而我想說清楚:今天的川普與共和黨,根本不是真正的保守主義。他們是披著保守外衣的激進派。

真正的保守主義,不相信用強力把社會強行塑造成某種樣子。

社會像人體。當某種制度開始扭曲它——例如十九世紀英國的穀物法——真正保守的做法,是移除那個扭曲,而不是硬把身體折成想要的形狀。廢除穀物法,是保守式改革。因為它不是強行塑造社會,而是移除已經造成扭曲的制度,讓社會自然恢復平衡。

川普的關稅則完全相反。那是一把大錘子。它試圖用政治暴力,硬把美國經濟壓回一個早已不適合的形狀。

這不是保守。這是激進主義。你不能靠外力強壓脊椎來治療它。那只會把它弄斷。

真正保守的做法,不會是關稅與找替罪羊。

而是耐心移除那些阻止人民與社區適應新時代的障礙:拆除保護既得利益者的監管俘虜;提升教育與勞動流動性;投資能幫助衰退地區重新轉型的基礎建設。

這些工作緩慢、無聊,也不討好。因為它不能給憤怒的群眾提供一個敵人,也沒有速成答案。

但它才是真正能解決問題,而不製造更多破壞的方法。

如今,美國兩大政黨都沒有在做這件事。共和黨在推關稅。民主黨則保護既有監管體系,同時沉迷於身份政治。兩邊都在「強行塑造」,而不是「移除扭曲」。

因此,我幾乎看不到真正的保守主義。

臨界點

最讓我擔心的是:

一旦社會滑過某個臨界點,衰敗就會開始自我強化,而且很難逆轉。

  • 憤怒的群眾會崇拜強人,鄙視那些必須靠民主程序爭取選票的政治人物。
  • 他們不理解反對黨與自由媒體是維持制度健康的一部分。他們只把那些人當成敵人。
  • 他們也不理解:領袖最重要是基本的誠信與原則。否則,不管他多聰明,只要掌權,就一定先為自己服務。
  • 但群眾只想要「自己人」成為無人能制衡的強人。於是,即使對方涉及詐欺、性侵、甚至試圖推翻合法選舉結果,他們也願意接受。
  • 於是,強人就在群眾支持下,一步步拆除制衡。先是在個案上突破制度的約束,再摧毀制度本身。
  • 接著,他還會在群眾支持下打壓「假新聞」,只留下對自己有利的資訊來源。

當最後一步完成時,就很難回頭了。

我不認為美國或英國已經跨過那條線。但我認為,它們正令人不安地朝那個方向前進。

這才是真正讓我擔心的事。

匈牙利給了我一些希望。在奧班統治下,匈牙利民主明顯倒退。我當時以為它已經越過臨界點,進入不可逆的階段。但我錯了。匈牙利人民仍保有足夠的反抗能力,民主修正最終還是出現了。所以,民主韌性是真實存在的。而那條臨界線,也許比我想像得更遠。

但韌性並不等於無敵。匈牙利的制度比美國與英國年輕得多、也淺得多。這意味著它更容易受損,但也可能更容易修復。而美國一旦真正崩壞,也許反而更難恢復。

美國也許會醒來,但英國更讓我擔心

現在的美國,幾乎所有曾支持川普主義的人口群體,都開始出現流失。他的聯盟正在裂解。期中選舉很可能成為一次重大反撲,讓美國開始慢慢從邊緣退回來。我並不盲目樂觀。川普的支持度,比許多人預期得更頑強。而即使川普本人被否定,催生他的條件仍然存在。

但美國仍有修正的可能。

真正讓我更擔心的,是英國。

英國一直親眼看著美國發生的一切。川普對制度的破壞、外交上的道德墮落、盟友的疏離、對民主規範的攻擊——這些都不是秘密。

但即使如此,英國仍把 Nigel Farage 與 Reform UK 推向接近主導政治的位置。

這才是最讓我害怕的地方。

因為這代表,民粹並不是川普個人的問題。它是結構性的。同樣的力量——經濟失落、精英對工人階級痛苦的漠視、演算法放大憤怒、主流政黨無法提出真正保守的修正方案——正在一個又一個國家複製同樣的結果。

如果這個判斷是對的,那麼「等美國修正後,浪潮就會過去」——這種想法就是錯的。

這股潮流不是美國獨有。美國只是第一波。英國是下一波。之後還會有更多。

而每一個跨過臨界點的國家,都會讓整個國際秩序變得更加危險。

最後,我是什麼樣的人

我是保守派。我相信民主、程序正義、緩慢而自然的調整;我相信移除扭曲,而不是強加答案。

我對西方未來十年並不樂觀,但也還沒有絕望。匈牙利讓我知道:民主韌性是真實存在的。

美國仍有運作中的法院、雖然碎片化但仍自由的媒體,以及尚未被完全操控的選舉制度。

英國的制度根基甚至更深。

臨界點是真實存在的,但我不認為它們已經跨過。

我真正希望的,是這些國家的精英階層,重新學會民主黨忘記的那個基本事實:你不能一邊否定人民的痛苦,一邊治理人民。

經濟轉型是真實的,而且大致不可避免。它帶來的痛苦,也是真實的,而且必須被承認。

真正的保守主義——耐心、結構性、專注於移除阻礙適應的扭曲——才是唯一誠實的回應。

關稅不是。替罪羊不是。煽動者不是。高高在上的技術官僚式傲慢,也不是。

我同時抱有希望,也感到憂慮。

Predicting the Outcome of Vladimir Trump’s Visit to China

Vladimir Trump’s visit to China may have two very different outcomes. Which outcome it will be depends on how the CCP positions Trump. Note this is not how the CCP positions the US — it is certainly an enemy, and this has not changed over the past decades — but its position toward Trump himself may be completely different.

If the CCP treatsTrump as an enemy

Since Trump took office, he has already destroyed every card tha the US can play.

On “Liberation Day” he imposed crazy tariffs on China, believing China would not dare retaliate. China’s rare earth blockade brought theUS to the brink of paralysis. Trump completely gave up confronting China, and since then has acted with great caution.

His series of hostile and insulting actions against Canada and European allies caused them to seek to improve relations with China. The anti-China encirclement carefully constructed by Biden and his predecessors starts to fall apart. China’s new energy and high-tech products are selling well throughout the world outside the US.

Because the adoption of new energy is far ahead, China’s dependence on imported energy is lower than that of most of the countries.

In short, China now has no critical dependence on the US.

America’s national debt has now exceeded GDP, almost reaching the level of U.S. debt after World War II. But bare in mind that the US debt only slightly exceeded GDP after fighting two world wars in Europe and Asia. Now its debt has already exceeded GDP, while not a single shot has yet been fired in the next world war with China! As I said in “The Consequences of Trump’s Reckless War: The Fall of Taiwan is Almost Inevitable,” the US merely possesses the military technology to easily win this war, but it no longer has the money to win it. Taiwan’s fall is almost a foregone conclusion.

Therefore, in the struggle between China and the US, the initiative is in the CCP’s hands.

Then Vladimir made exactly the same mistake again in Iran. Ignoring the strong warnings of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff he himself appointed and the U.S. Joint Intelligence Committee, he believed Iran would not dare blockade the Strait of Hormuz and launched attacks against Iran aimed at regime change. As a result, Iran’s blockade caused enormous losses to the entire world including the US. The war faced strong opposition in the U.S. Congress and among former allies, so although Iran continues blocking the strait and continuously attacking Gulf states, Trump does not dare use force again. The CIA judged that Iran could hold out for four months. However, because Russia’s route through the Caspian Sea for transporting food, ammunition, and military industrial equipment to Iran remains unobstructed, and the US is powerless to interfere, Iran’s ability to bypass the American blockade will only grow.

Therefore, in the struggle between the US and Iran, the initiative is in Iran’s hands.

Isn’t Vladimir Trump guaranteed to receive a large collection of “Hero of Russia” medals?

So, why would CCP give up anything to Vladimir?

Therefore, if China positions Trump as an enemy, not only will he return empty-handed from this visit to China, he will be humiliated.

If the CCP positions Trump as an ally

However, the CCP is not stupid enough to fail to see that, in the little more than a year since Vladimir took office, he has caused losses to the US greater than what ten more World War IIs could have caused, while providing opportunities to the CCP and Russia that they previously would not even have dared dream of. It cannot fail to see that Vladimir is an ally beyond their wildest dreams. If the Republican Party suffers a crushing defeat in the November midterm elections and loses two-thirds of the seats in both houses — a possibility that cannot be ignored — then Vladimir will certainly be impeached, and American foreign policy will inevitably return to its previous normal state. Then the good days for the CCP and Putin will be over.

Therefore, although the US has been humilated in the Middle East, although Trump holds no cards at all and Iran and the CCP possess the initiative, you will see that the CCP will still give Trump gifts sufficient to preserve at least some face for him, to help the Republican Party avoid losing two-thirds of the seats in the midterm elections.

You will see that, in the eyes of the CCP, Vladimir is a friend, not an enemy.

預測弗拉基米尔·川普訪華成果

弗拉基米尔·川普訪華,可能有二個非常不同的結果,究竟哪個結果取決於中共對川普的定位。注意這不是中共對美國的定位——對美國的定位肯定是敵人,這一點過去幾十年都沒有變,但對它川普的定位可能完全不同。

如果中共把川普定位為敵人

川普上台以來,已經把所有能打的牌全毀掉了。

他在“解放日”對中國征收高額關稅,以為中國不敢反擊,結果中國的稀土封鎖讓美國面臨停擺的危險,川普徹底放棄了對付中國,此後一直陪著小心。

他的一系列得罪加拿大和歐洲盟友的舉措讓後者開始大力改善與中國的關係,拜登及其歷屆前任所精心構築的反華包圍圈基本泡湯。中國的各種新能源、高科技產品在美國以外的世界暢銷。

因為新能源的普及遙遙領先,中國對進口能源的依賴低於世界上絕大多數國家。

總而言之,中國現在對美國沒有生死攸關的依賴。

美國現在的國債超過了GDP,幾乎達到了二戰後美國的國債水平,但不要忘記,美國是在歐洲、亞洲打了二場世界大戰後,國債才略微超過GDP;現在它的國債已經超過GDP,而它和中國的世界大戰還一槍未放呢!就如我在《川普輕啟戰端的後果:台灣的淪陷幾乎已成定局》中所說,美國徒有輕鬆贏得這場戰爭的軍事科技,但它已經沒有錢去贏了,台灣的淪陷幾成定局。

所以,中美之爭,主動權完全掌握在中共手裡。

然後,弗拉基米尔在伊朗又犯了一模一樣的錯誤。他不顧自己任命的參謀長聯席會議主席和美國情報聯合委員會會的強烈警告,認為伊朗不敢封鎖霍爾姆斯海峽,對伊朗發起以政權更迭為目的的打擊,結果伊朗的封鎖讓包括美國在內的全世界損失慘重。戰爭在美國國會和昔日盟友中遭到強烈反對,所以雖然伊朗持續封鎖海峽並不斷攻擊海灣國家,川普卻不敢再次動武。CIA判斷伊朗完全可以撐過四個月,然而,因為俄羅斯通過里海向伊朗運輸糧草彈藥軍工設備的通路暢通無阻,美國無力干預,伊朗繞過美國封鎖的能力只會越來越好。

戰前,伊朗不敢封鎖海峽,不敢肆意攻擊海灣國家,現在它大大方方地做,沒有後果。

MAGA: Make Adversarie Great Again.

所以,美伊之爭,主動權完全掌握在伊朗手裡。

你看,弗拉基米尔·川普是不是穩拿一大把“俄羅斯英雄”勛章?

所以,如果中國把川普定位為敵人,他此次訪華訪華不僅要空手而歸嗎,而且必然受盡羞辱。

如果中共把川普定位為盟友

然而,中共沒有蠢到這個程度,會看不出弗拉基米尔上任一年多來,對美國造成了再打十遍二戰都造成不了的損失,給中共和俄國提供了以往做夢都不敢想的機遇。它不會看不出,弗拉基米尔是他們做夢都不敢想的盟友。如果共和黨在11月的中期選舉中大敗虧輸,丟掉了三分之二的兩院席位——這一點有不可忽略的可能,那麼弗拉基米尔鐵定被彈劾,美國的外交必定重回以往的非瘋癲狀態,那麼中共、普京的好日子就過去了。

所以,雖然美國在中東顏面盡失,焦頭爛額,雖然川普手裡沒有任何牌,伊朗、中共掌握完全的主動權,你會看到,中共仍然會給川普送上足夠挽回起碼顏面的禮物,好幫助共和黨在中期選舉中不丟掉三分之二的席位。

但這肯定不會是為了拼命討好川普、美國的大禮。不要期待中國會施壓伊朗作出重大讓步——美國在伊朗深陷泥潭對中共的好處比天大,它沒有任何必要放棄這個好處。

你會看到,在中共眼裡,弗拉基米尔是友非敵。

【順便】

我們這些州緊急救援志願者們在練習僅僅用塑料布將水流改道,避免灌進居民住宅。我覺得很酷:

今天救出一隻漂亮的黑白貓…

Speakable Truths Are Not True Truths

It was on YouTube that I first heard the meaning of the Tao Te Ching’s opening line: “道可道,非常道”:

Speakable truths are not true truths. Speakable names are not true names.

“Isn’t this exactly what I realized in meditation?”

Laozi lived around 500 BC. Buddhism didn’t reach China until 600 years later. Yet what he saw aligns with Buddhist teaching. This proved again that there is only one true wisdom in this world, whatever label we stick on it.

What Laozi meant was that the real TRUTH, the Tao, cannot be told. If you use just one word to describe it, then that is one word too many, one word away from it.

The TRUTH can only be realized by yourself in your epiphany.

So if an enlightened sage demanded I tell him what the truth of the world is, I would look at him, and stay silent.

This TRUTH, the “emptiness” or “nothingness”, is what I realized in my meditation.

However, as the Heart Sutra says: “No wisdom, and no attainment.” Even my awakening is an illusion.

The moment I tell myself, “I found the truth!”, I walked away from it.

The act of me writing this article is a deviation from the TRUTH.

Then why do I do it? Why are there so many scriptures and books preaching the way?

The TRUTH sits on a sheer peak. All the scriptures and temples exist to bring you to the foot of the mountain — to trim you down, build your strength, fit you out with the gear for the climb. The last thousand meters of cliff, you climb alone.

What does “emptiness” mean?

This world is like a pond. Substances of every color interact, give off scents and sounds — endlessly bustling.

In all this commotion, acid neutralizes alkali, high despises low, cold defeats heat, yin cancels yang. The best time of your life is followed by decline. Unbreakable oaths of love will still be broken by death.

Once you see through the commotion, you see the pond’s true nature: a clear pool of autumn water — colorless, scentless, soundless, formless, meaningless, free of the grip of time.

Because the sun continues to inject energy, the pond stays bustling forever.

But once you know its true nature, you no longer cling to the colors, the scents, the sounds.

You can savor every fleeting beauty in life — fine food, friendship, love, scenery — but, when it all vanishes in an instant, your heart stays still as that pool of autumn water.

Because nothing has changed.

Huineng, the Sixth Patriarch of Zen Buddhism in the 7th century, said:

“There is not a single thing — where could dust gather?”

It is not that the outer material world is empty. Someone on YouTube said that the vast empty space in atoms proves the emptiness. He gave himself away. Slam your head into a wall, and you get blood all over your face. There is real substance there.

“Emptiness” is the state of mind when you attain the Tao.

Hitler Would Have Easily Got The Nobel Peace Prize

In 1940, German army occupied Norway, and mass executions of resistance fighters were routine. If Hitler had wanted the Nobel Peace Prize, he wouldn’t have needed to compete — he only had to send a hint to the committee, and no one would have dared defy him. The prize was in his bag.

But the thought never crossed his mind.

Because apart from his faith in the law of the jungle, and his ruthlessness toward those he saw as evil enemies, in the eyes of German people at the time, Hitler was seen as a man of impeccable honor.

He did not refuse to pay after contractors had rendered their services to him.

He did not engage in commercial fraud.

He did not commit adultery, did not call prostitutes, did not frequent the criminal haunts of pedophiles, and remained faithful to Eva Braun to the end.

This was why, when only the single street around the Reich Chancellery in Berlin remained unconquered by the Soviet Red Army, underage German youths would man rifles and artillery, fight to the last moment, and then put a bullet through their own heads. After his suicide, his generals still said, “The Führer forbade us to surrender" — and then, one after another, raised their pistols and shot themselves. You can’t attribute this to brainwashing. Stalin and Mao were masters in brain washing, but no one was willing to die with them.

Now, take a look at this piece of news:

Trump likely among 287 candidates for Nobel Peace Prize

My God!!!!

This idiot truly does not — literally — know that there is such a thing in this world as “shame"!

Alas, America!

Once, she was the world’s moral high ground, a beacon of democracy, the sanctuary longed for by all persecuted.

Today, it is an oppressor, a murderer, a cesspit into which Trump discharges his endless filth.

希特勒本來穩拿諾貝爾和平獎

1940年,德軍佔領了挪威,成批槍殺抵抗者是家常便飯。如果希特勒想要諾貝爾和平獎,他不需要“角逐”,他只要派人給委員會一個暗示,沒人敢抗命。穩拿。

但他想都沒想過。

因為除了篤信弱肉強食的叢林法則,對他眼裡的邪惡敵人無比殘酷,在當時的德國的上流社會眼裡,希特勒是一個個人操守完美無瑕的謙謙君子。

他不在雇用的個人或企業給他提供完服務後拒絕付費。

他不進行商業欺詐。

他不通姦,不嫖娼,不光顧戀童者的犯罪場所,對愛人艾娃從一而終。

這就是為什麼在柏林只剩下總理府周圍最後一條街沒有被蘇聯紅軍攻佔時,未成年的德國年輕人會操槍操炮戰鬥到最後時刻,然後飲彈自盡。他自殺後,他的將軍們仍然說,“元首不許我們投降,” 於是紛紛舉槍自殺。你不可能把這都歸於戈培爾的洗腦——斯大林和毛都是洗腦的高手,但沒有任何人願意為他們陪葬。

現在,你再看看這條新聞:

诺贝尔和平奖287人或组织获提名 川普可能再角逐

我的上帝!!!!

這個傻逼是真的 ——literally——不知道世界上還有“廉恥”二字呀!

哀哉,美國!

昔日,她是全世界的道德高地和民主燈塔,是所有受迫害者嚮往的避難所。

今天,它是謀殺犯,是迫害者,是供川普排洩他的無盡污穢的糞坑。

如果我是伊朗軍方

如果我是伊朗軍方,我就在一艘巨型油輪中隱藏二百名特種部隊,然後讓它去試圖衝破美海軍在霍爾慕斯海峽的封鎖線。美海軍不願炮擊油輪引起大火、重大平民船員的傷亡和大範圍污染,於是派一二十個特種部隊乘直升機降落油輪。

在這些美軍從直升機索降甲板後,隱藏的伊軍特種部隊迅速衝出,將美軍團團圍住,另一部分伊軍舉著肩扛式單兵防空飛彈,掀開帆布,露出防空火砲,對美軍直升機進行警告式射擊,逼其撤離。如果美軍直升機已經降落在甲板上,那就更好了,連直升機、飛行員一起活捉。

這樣一來,伊朗左手有核彈級別的霍爾慕斯海峽,右手有二十名美軍特種部隊當人質,就可以獅子大開口,既要又要了。