From the start of the war until a year ago, Ukraine was, in NATO’s eyes, a great burden — its war with Russia carried the risk of dragging NATO into war with Russia, even nuclear war.
Imagine you are the boss of one of New York’s two great crime families — the Gambinos. You and the Genovese family each have your own turf, live and let live, each raking in fortunes and living the high life. Then one day, one of your made men gets into a fight with the Genoveses — a blood feud, irreconcilable. If you don’t back him, you’ll be seen as a coward with no sense of loyalty, and your soldiers will desert you. But if you do back him, the Gambinos and the Genoveses could be plunged into a fight to the death — rivers of blood, both families crippled.
So you have no choice but to prop him up just enough to keep him from being wiped out, while carefully avoiding a total rupture with the Genoveses. Day after day you walk a tightrope; one wrong step and the sky falls in. Deep down, you surely wish you could turn back time and never have taken this man into the family.
From the start of the war until a year ago, this is largely how NATO saw Ukraine.
But over the past year, Ukraine’s fighting power has begun to swell rapidly. I summed this up in my August 2, 2026 piece, Ukraine War (44): A Summary of the Current State of the War. Though it lacks the death-defying sense of honor of the British and American militaries, the Ukrainian army — forged and winnowed through four years of bloody war — is one of only two armies in the world fully adapted to warfare in the drone age, and the only army in the world guaranteed to fight to a standstill, at minimal cost, against the Russian army that has been forged and winnowed through the same four years of bloody war and is equally adapted to drone-age warfare. If the Russian army were to attack Poland, as NATO intelligence has predicted, we would very likely see the Polish army — far better equipped than the Ukrainians — suffer great losses; even a collapse would not be entirely out of the question.
Recent reports say that the anti-missile interceptor Ukraine has been developing with NATO support may enter production within months. Bear in mind that anti-missile interceptors are far harder to build than missiles, and the Russian army currently possesses essentially no anti-missile capability — the much-hyped S-400 offers essentially no defense against the NATO missiles Ukraine launches. If Ukraine’s interceptor really can enter production that quickly, then the overall strength of the Ukrainian army may in fact rank among the very best in Europe.
It’s as if that man of yours who fought the Genoveses had, through years of bloody struggle, built up a crew of crack shots and master knife-fighters, fearless and ferocious, who fought the Genoveses to a draw with not much help from you — while your own soldiers, after years of soft living, can no longer shoot straight and faint at the sight of blood. Would you still treat him as a burden then?
What would be going through your mind?
“I’d better keep on this man’s good side and make sure he stays with me. Otherwise, if he ever goes over to the Genoveses one day, I’m finished."
A year ago, NATO would not agree to accept Ukraine, because Ukraine was continuously losing ground. The very second Ukraine joined NATO, NATO would automatically be at war with Russia — because under Article 5 of the NATO charter, if new member Ukraine comes under large-scale armed attack, NATO must join the fight.
Today, for the very same reason, NATO still will not agree to accept Ukraine.
But in NATO’s eyes, Ukraine is no longer a burden. It is now a vital partner that must be respected and carefully maintained, because it is one of the strongest military powers in Europe. The rich experience and technology Ukraine has accumulated on the battlefield are an indispensable resource for NATO. Without that experience and technology, if a battle-hardened Russian army that has mastered drone-age warfare were to attack NATO, NATO could suffer devastating losses — its defensive lines might even collapse.
A worse possibility — though a small one — is that someday a Ukrainian strongman in the mold of Putin comes to power. At that point, if NATO still refuses Ukraine membership as before, still helps Ukraine only with one hand tied behind its back, he could say to the Ukrainian people:
“Look! We sacrificed a million of our young to shield Europe from Russia’s assault, and still Europe shows no gratitude, still shuts us out. Europe is not the hope for Ukraine’s security. We must normalize relations with Russia."
If he could consolidate power in Ukraine the way Putin has in Russia, then the odds of his becoming Putin’s ally would be high. An alliance between two of Europe’s foremost military powers would be the ultimate nightmare for Europe — and for the world.
Remember what I always tell my readers: what goes unsaid often matters more than what is said?
Though you will hear nothing of this from NATO publicly, the relationship between NATO and Ukraine has already quietly changed — no longer a one-way valve with NATO endlessly transfusing blood into Ukraine, but a near-equal partnership in which each side urgently needs the other.
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