Fable 1: Name Change

The mole lived in rich, soft soil teeming with earthworms, his favourite food. But lately he had been deeply troubled.

A cunning yellow fox had appeared in his territory. Its hearing and sense of smell were extraordinarily keen. The mole moved house several times, but each time the yellow fox tracked him down and dug open his burrow. In this way, the fox ate the mole’s wife and five of his sons. Now only his cleverest son remained.

One day, the mole was once again discussing with his son what they should do. Suddenly, he slapped his thigh.

“I’ve got a brilliant idea! We’ll give the fox a new name. We’ll call him an earthworm. From now on, he doesn’t eat us—we eat him!”

The next day, the mole was near the entrance of the burrow looking for earthworms when his son came hurtling in from outside.

“Earthworm’s coming!”

Before the words had even left his mouth, the son had already disappeared into the deepest part of the burrow.

The mole froze for a moment, then shouted into the depths:

“Do you mean the earthworm we eat, or the earthworm that eats us?”

Before he could finish, daylight flooded into his eyes accustomed to darkness. The last thing he felt was the fox’s sharp teeth piercing his belly.


Hey idiot, you won’t get anything by simply renaming it–whether is is a gulf or a lake!

预言一则: 改名

鼹鼠住的地方土壤肥沃松软,富有他最喜欢吃的蚯蚓。但他最近很烦恼。他的领地上来了一只狡猾的黄狐狸,听觉、嗅觉极其灵敏,鼹鼠数次搬家,都被黄狐狸找到并挖开,鼹鼠的太太和五个儿子都这样被狐狸吃掉了,只剩下一个最机灵的儿子和他相依为命。

这天,鼹鼠又和儿子商量怎么办。鼹鼠忽然一拍大腿:

“我有个好主意! 从今以后,咱们给狐狸改个名字,叫蚯蚓。以后,他不吃我们,我们吃他!"

第二天,鼹鼠正在洞口附近找蚯蚓,儿子从洞外一阵风般冲进来,

“蚯蚓来了!"

话音未落,儿子已经钻进最深处不见了。

鼹鼠愣了一下,对深处喊:

“是我们吃的蚯蚓,还是吃我们的蚯蚓?"

还没说完,眼前一花,天光照在鼹鼠习惯了黑暗的眼里,他最后的感觉就是狐狸的尖牙刺穿自己的肚子。


蠢货,一样你本来得不到的东西,不论是一个海湾,还是一个湖,靠改名你也得不到!

Putin Is Highly Likely to Attack a NATO Country

On August 25, the CIA Director landed in Moscow aboard a massive U.S. military C-17 transport aircraft. He stayed for eight hours before leaving. Most mainstream U.S. media interpreted the visit that the CIA had obtained intelligence suggesting that Putin was preparing to launch a medium- to large-scale provocation against the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, and the CIA chief wanted to preamp it.

The most likely scenario would begin with a false-flag operation: Russian forces posing as the military, aircraft, drones, or missiles of one of these countries and attacking Russian territory. Putin would then address the nation, declaring that the motherland had come under an outrageous NATO attack, calling on the Russian people to defend their country, ordering full-scale wartime mobilization, and then launching attacks against these countries.

Putin’s Calculation

If NATO retaliates by striking Russian territory, it would rally Russians around the flag. Putin would then have the justification he needs to institute full wartime mobilization and mass conscription without encountering opposition from the elite classes of major cities such as Moscow and St. Petersburg.

In Putin’s eyes, after four years of brutal war, both the Russian and Ukrainian armies have accumulated extensive combat experience, developed formidable fighting capabilities, and mastered the new era of drone warfare, making them the two most battle-hardened armies in Europe.

By contrast, the populations of other European countries, including Germany and Poland, have spent 70 years living in comfort and relying entirely on American protection. Their military traditions have been largely broken. If they were suddenly plunged into a large-scale, high-intensity war with Russia—once their stocks of sophisticated long-range munitions were rapidly depleted and they had to fight at close quarters while suffering heavy casualties—whether their forces would hold together or simply fall apart is genuinely an open question.

Of the Russian and Ukrainian armies, Russia’s is stronger and relies essentially on Russia’s own resources. Ukraine, by contrast, has been able to keep fighting only because of massive financial and military assistance from NATO countries.

Now consider this simple logic problem:

1. You and John are fighting to the death, and neither side can defeat the other.

2. John survives because Peter keeps giving him ammos. Stop the aid and John immediately surrenders.

3. You believe you could defeat Peter relatively easily.

What would you do?

The obvious conclusion is that you threaten to attack Peter and force him to stop supplying ammo to John.

Putin is not crazy. Anyone faced with the same calculation would arrive at the same conclusion.

The Baltic states would be chosen because they are small and militarily weak.

The CIA Director’s Calculation

His surprise visit may have been intended to tell the Russians three things:

1. We already know what you are planning. You can no longer fabricate a NATO attack on Russia. If you continue preparing for an attack, we will expose your plans publicly.

2. The Baltic states will be prepared. You will not achieve an easy victory.

3. If you attack, the United States will act decisively to defend NATO.

Effect

The CIA Director’s visit will most likely have little effect.

First, after the Bolsheviks—and then Putin, who is even more vile, ruthless and perverse than the Bolsheviks—poisoned Russia down to its roots, the Russian people have degenerated from the Russia of Tolstoy, in which an aristocratic elite presided over poor, ignorant but fundamentally decent peasants, into a race of beasts completely incompatible with modern society. (My apologies to the beasts for insulting them.) These beasts no longer need an excuse to invade and slaughter another people, or even their own compatriots.

Second, as discussed above, attacking NATO in order to force it to abandon its support for Ukraine may be Putin’s only option for avoiding catastrophic defeat and his own physical destruction. If he does not use it, he has no chance of winning. If he does, he may not necessarily lose. Therefore, he will not abandon this option.

Third, in several previous articles I have discussed in depth the mentality of dictators driven by extreme psychological fear, most comprehensively in an article I wrote before the outbreak of the Ukraine war, History Has Placed Putin on the Same Road Once Taken by Hitler. In Putin’s eyes, he must maintain the image of a strongman, and the only way to maintain that image is through relentless militarism.
If the CIA Director can simply fly into Moscow and frighten him into backing down, what is left of his strongman image? In this jungle of beasts, once his strongman image collapses, the price will not merely be losing office. It will be his physical elimination.

Fourth, before Comrade Vladimir Trump came to power, whether the United States would intervene militarily was a decisive factor in determining how such a war might develop. But now, the United States has nearly exhausted its stocks of precision-guided munitions and air-defense missiles in Iran, where there was no need for it to intervene in the first place, and has transferred the last U.S. aircraft carrier in Asia to the Iranian theater.

U.S. national debt has surpassed $40 trillion. The reliability of U.S. government debt is increasingly being questioned around the world, forcing the United States to pay ever-higher interest rates on long-term debt because otherwise nobody wants to buy it. Interest payments on the national debt are approaching the point of overwhelming the federal budget.

Taking advantage of America’s predicament, China has become increasingly aggressive in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.

Against this background, America’s willingness, ability, and likelihood of entering a large-scale direct war with Russia in Europe are all low.

(I recently heard that Comrade Vladimir Trump’s approval rating among Republicans is far higher than those of some of the greatest presidents in American history. My jaw hit the floor. It seems the gap between Trump supporters and Russia’s beasts really isn’t that large after all.)

Therefore, even if the CIA Director threatened that the United States would enter the war, whether Putin would actually be frightened by that threat is far from certain.

Fifth, there is a major question as to whether Putin’s subordinates—who have spent years deceiving him and falsely reporting battlefield successes—would even convey the CIA Director’s message to Putin accurately.

How Putin Might Attack

It is unlikely that Putin would begin immediately with a ground invasion. He would more likely start with drone and missile strikes. Then, if NATO failed to respond decisively, he could gradually increase the scale and intensity of the attacks.

How NATO would Respond

How NATO responds would severely test the alliance’s wisdom.

If NATO retaliates decisively by striking Russian territory, it plays directly into Putin’s hands, giving him the justification he needs for full wartime mobilization and further escalation.

But if NATO fails to respond, that also plays directly into Putin’s hands. He can gradually broaden and intensify his attacks on NATO, eventually forcing the alliance to choose between ending its support for Ukraine and going to war with Russia. Either choice would be disastrous.

The best response would be for NATO to remain on the defensive outside Ukraine—shooting down Russian drones and missiles and repelling any Russian ground incursions—while going on the offensive in Ukraine by dramatically increasing both the quantity and quality of military assistance to Ukrainian forces.

If Putin’s attacks on NATO became sufficiently intense, NATO could directly deploy combat aircraft, and potentially even ground forces, to fight in Ukraine.

At that point, the question in the Ukraine war would no longer be whether Russian advances could be stopped. It would become a question of how long Ukraine would need to recover all of its occupied territory. Once Ukraine had recovered all of its lost territory, Putin’s incentive to provoke NATO would disappear.

At the same time, by refraining from attacking Russian territory even after coming under direct Russian attack, NATO would demonstrate extraordinary restraint and deny Putin sufficient justification for escalating the conflict further.

The Ukraine battlefield presents an extremely unique situation and opportunity: NATO can strike Russia hard without doing so on Russian territory, and because Russians do not face the fear of national annihilation, there is no strong impulse to use nuclear weapons.

If Putin nevertheless chose to escalate unilaterally into full-scale war, his Chinese and Indian allies would not accept it.

普京攻击北约国家是大概率事件

8月25日,中情局局長乘坐美軍巨無霸軍機C-17降落在莫斯科。停留了8個小時就離開了。美國主流媒體大多解讀為,中情局掌握了普京即將對波羅的海三國愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞、立陶宛發起中、大規模挑釁。

最可能的是以「假旗」(false flag)行動開始,冒充這些國家的軍隊、軍機、無人機或導彈進攻俄國領土,然後普京發表全國講話,說祖國遭到北約悍然進攻,號召人民保衛祖國,全面戰爭動員,然後對這些國家發起進攻。

普京的算盤

如果北約予以還擊,攻擊俄國本土,會激起俄國人同仇敵愾,於是普京就有了在全國進行全面戰爭動員、大規模徵兵的藉口,不會遭到莫斯科、聖彼得堡等大城市精英階層的反對。

在普京眼裡,俄軍和烏軍经过四年残酷的战争,军队作战经验丰富,战斗力强,掌握了无人机攻防的新时代战争,成了歐洲戰力最強的兩支勁旅。其他歐洲国家包括德国、波兰的国民经过70年的養尊處優和完全依賴美國的保護,軍隊傳統完全斷層,一旦和俄國發生大規模高強度戰爭,在高科技遠程彈藥很快打光,需要短兵相接時,出現慘重傷亡時,是否會一鬨而散,着實是個未知數。

俄烏二軍中,俄军更强,靠的基本上是自己的国力,而乌军之所以能撑下去完全是北约国家大规模金援和军援的原因。

現在你考慮一下這個邏輯推理題:

1。你和張三拼命,勢均力敵;

2。張三靠李四輸血,輸血一停,張三立馬倒下;

3。你可能輕鬆打敗李四。

你會做什麼?

結論一定是威脅打李四,逼他停止給張三輸血。

所以,普京此舉並不瘋狂,任何人都會得出同一個結論。

之所以選波羅的海三國,是因爲他們很小,軍力太弱。

中情局長的算盤

他這次突訪可能想告訴俄國人這些:

1。我們已經知道你的企圖了,你們無法再僞造遭北約進攻了。如果你們繼續準備進攻,我們就公開揭露你們。

2 。波羅的海三國會做好準備,你們不會輕易獲勝的。

3。如果你們進攻,美國會堅決行動保衛北約。

效果

中情局長此行大概率沒有效果。

首先,經過布爾什維克和比布爾什維克更加下賤、狠毒、變態的普京的刨根毒化,俄羅斯這個人種已經從托爾斯泰時代的貴族領導貧窮愚昧但善良的農民,蛻化成爲一個和現代社會完全不兼容的牲口種族(抱歉牲口們我侮辱你們了)。這群牲口進攻並屠殺另一個種族甚至他們自己同胞已經不需要藉口。

第二,如前所述,通過進攻北約迫使其放棄支持烏克蘭是普京唯一可能避免慘敗和肉體消滅的選項。不用它,毫無勝算;用了,不一定會輸。所以他不會放棄的。

第三,我以前有多篇文章深入討論了心理恐懼極大的獨裁者的心態,最全面的是烏戰爆發前«歷史將普京推上了希特勒曾走的那條路»。在普京眼裏,自己必須維持一個強人形象,而維持這個形象的唯一方法就是窮兵黷武。如果中情局長飛來莫斯科二個小時就把他嚇破了膽,那他還有什麼強人形象? 在這個牲口們弱肉強食的叢林中,他的強人形象一旦崩塌,代價不是下臺,而是肉身消滅。

第四,在弗拉基米爾·川普同志上台前,美國是否會軍事介入是戰事如何發展的關鍵因素。但現在,美國已經在完全沒有必要介入的伊朗幾乎打完了精確制導彈藥和防空導彈,把亞洲的最後一艘航母調往了伊朗,美國國債突破了40萬億,國債在世人眼裏的可靠性越來越低,美國被迫爲長期國債付出越來越高的利息,否則沒人願意買,國債利息已經到了快要壓垮財政的地步。因爲美國的窘境,中國在南海和臺灣海峽越來越咄咄逼人。在這種背景下,美國在歐洲直接和俄國進行大規模戰爭的意願、能力和可能性都很低。(最近聽說弗拉基米爾·川普同志在共和黨裏的支持率遠超歷史上最偉大的總統們,我的下巴掉在地上了。看來川粉們和俄國牲口們的差距真的不大呀。)

所以,即便中情局長威脅美國參戰,普京是否害怕還不一定。

第五,常年欺騙普京謊報戰功的手下會不會把中情局長的話如實轉告普京,是一個很大的問號。

普京的進攻方式

普京一上來就進行地面入侵的可能性很低,他可能會先用無人機、導彈進行空襲,然後,如果北約沒有堅決回擊,則逐漸加大攻擊力度。

北約的回應方式

北約的回應方式非常考驗北約的智慧。

如果北約進行堅決回擊,打擊俄國本土,則正中普京下懷,給了他全面戰爭動員和升級事態的藉口。

而如果北約沒有反應,也正中普京下懷,他可以逐步擴大對北約進攻的寬度和烈度,北約將不得不在停止援助烏克蘭和與俄國開戰之間選擇。二邊都是災難。

最佳的回應方式是在烏克蘭之外的戰場採取守勢,擊落俄國無人機和導彈,擊退俄軍地面入侵,而在烏克蘭採取攻勢,提升對烏軍援的規模和質量。如果普京對北約的進攻烈度足夠大,北約可以直接派戰機甚至地面部隊在烏克蘭參戰。那時,烏戰就不再是能否停止俄軍進展的問題了,而是烏克蘭多久可以收復全部失地的問題了。一旦烏克蘭收復所有失地,普京挑釁北約的動機就不存在了。

乌克兰战场提供了一个极其独特的场合和机会: 北约可以在俄国领土之外狠狠打击俄国,俄国人不会有亡国灾种的恐惧,就没有动用核武的冲动。

同時,北約在被俄國直接進攻的情況下仍然沒有對俄國本土發動打擊,表現出了高度忍耐,沒有給普京升級事態足夠的藉口。如果普京單方面全面升級,他的中國和印度盟友不會答應。-

My Prophecy Fulfilled: Trump Embraces Dictators and Alienates Democratic Allies

In January 2025, just as Trump took office, I made a prediction in The First Signs That America’s Hungarian Transformation Has Begun:

Once a would-be dictator begins concentrating power, he enters a vicious cycle: the more power he grabs, the stronger the opposition grows, and the more insecure he feels — because a democratic leader who leaves office still lives in comfort, but a dictator who falls faces prison or death. So he grabs even harder.

At that point, his priorities change. The country’s interests take a back seat to the security of his own power. Anyone who opposes his power grab becomes a threat to his life and fortune; anyone who doesn’t oppose it — and especially anyone who helps it along — becomes his best friend.

…

China and Russia would love nothing more than to watch America slide into authoritarianism, so they will certainly extend a hand to an American dictator. And he, in turn — just as he changed his mind about ByteDance — will warm relations with Russia and China and build an alliance of dictators.

Hasn’t it come true?

Let’s take stock of what Comrade Vladimir Trump has accomplished in the first eight months of 2026. I guarantee that by the end, you will have no doubt who his allies are — and who his enemies are.

On China:

  • Jan 13 — Export policy on H200-class chips, critical to the AI race, flipped from “presumption of denial" to “case-by-case review"
  • Jan 22 — The TikTok deal closed: ByteDance kept roughly 20% of the equity and kept the algorithm
  • Jan 23 — The National Defense Strategy declared, in writing, that America’s goal “is not to dominate China; nor is it to strangle or humiliate them"
  • Feb 4 — An “excellent" phone call; Beijing’s readout has Trump saying “I want to see China succeed"
  • Feb 8 — Jimmy Lai sentenced to 20 years — zero response from Washington
  • Feb 10 — The DEA restored police-to-police cooperation with China’s Ministry of Public Security
  • Feb 13 — The Pentagon yanked its “Chinese military companies" list update twice in two days (it would have added Alibaba, Baidu and BYD)
  • Feb 20 — The Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs; the White House replaced them with a country-blind scheme under which China’s tariff burden fell more than anyone else’s on earth
  • Feb 26 — Nvidia received its first license to export H200s to China
  • Mid-year — Enforcement of the Uyghur forced-labor law quietly ground to a halt (customs seizures collapsed by 87%)
  • May 12 — To Xi Jinping: “You’re a great leader… it’s an honor to be your friend"
  • May 14 — Ten Chinese companies (Alibaba, Tencent, ByteDance, JD.com and others) cleared to buy H200s
  • May 14 — “A constructive China–US relationship of strategic stability" written into the record; the White House readout never mentioned Taiwan at all
  • May 15 — “I’m not looking to have somebody go independent"; called arms sales to Taiwan “a very good negotiating chip"
  • May 15 — Human rights weren’t on the summit agenda; Jimmy Lai got one mention and was dropped
  • May 18 — A US–China Board of Trade and Board of Investment established; a $30 billion mutual tariff-reduction framework agreed in principle
  • May 19 — The $14 billion arms package for Taiwan frozen
  • May 28 — US–China maritime military consultations resumed in Hawaii
  • Jun 2 — The US Trade Representative formally asked industry which China tariffs to cut — the first exercise of its kind since 2018
  • Jun 8 — CNOOC, COSCO and eight other firms removed from the “Chinese military companies" list
  • Jun 16 — The words “Indo-Pacific" abolished: Indo-Pacific Command renamed back to Pacific Command
  • Jun 20 — “You know who is very smart? President Xi of China"
  • Jul 17 — Hong Kong sanctions dismantled wholesale: all 48 officials — including John Lee and Carrie Lam — removed from the SDN list; China’s Commerce Ministry called it “an important step in fulfilling the consensus reached in the trade talks"
  • Jul 27 — Beijing announced that Washington had promised to cap replacement tariffs at 20%
  • Aug 13 — America’s last aircraft carrier in the Western Pacific, the USS George Washington, pulled out and sent to the Middle East; Global Times celebrated a “zero-US-carrier zone"
  • Aug 17 — The US–South Korea “Ulchi Freedom Shield" exercise gutted: eleven days cut to five, the entire counterattack phase cancelled
  • Aug 19 — Taiwan Strait transits this term on track to be half of previous administrations’ (14, versus 32 under Biden)
  • Aug 19 — The first H200 shipments landed in China: roughly ten thousand chips each for ByteDance and Tencent

And for America’s European NATO allies?

  • Jan 5 — The Greenland crisis reignited: Trump again refused to rule out military force; Hegseth said the military option is “always on the table"; Trump: “One way or the other, we’re going to have Greenland"
  • Jan 7 — Withdrawal from 66 international organizations and treaties in one sweep, including the UN climate treaty; Europe condemned “a new low"
  • Jan 17 — 10% tariffs on eight European NATO allies (Denmark, the UK, Germany, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Finland), with a threat of 25% by June 1, “until a deal is reached for the complete and total purchase of Greenland"; the eight issued a joint protest
  • Feb 5 & 19 — Open interference in an EU member state’s election: a full-throated endorsement of Hungary’s Orbán
  • Feb 15 — At Munich, Rubio carried the National Security Strategy’s message, blaming Europe’s “civilizational decline" on the “climate cult" and “mass migration"; EU chief diplomat Kallas formally rejected the “civilizational erasure" thesis
  • Feb 20 — Hours after the Supreme Court struck down the IEEPA tariffs, a 10% global surcharge was imposed under Section 122 — denying Europe any relief from the ruling and knocking the legal foundation out from under the US–EU trade deal
  • Mar 15 — For his war on Iran, Trump demanded that seven countries — most of them European — send warships to force open the Strait of Hormuz, warning “we will remember" those who refuse; EU leaders collectively refused
  • Mar 17 — Rebuffed, he erupted: “We no longer ‘need,’ or desire, the NATO countries’ assistance — WE NEVER DID!"
  • Apr 1 — Said he was “strongly considering" leaving NATO; Rubio said America would “re-examine" NATO’s value
  • Apr 7 — Called NATO a “paper tiger" that Putin doesn’t fear; in the same breath, back to Greenland: “We want Greenland. They don’t want to give it to us. And I said, ‘bye bye'"
  • May 1 — Retribution against allies who refused his war: ordered more than 5,000 troops out of Germany (“cutting a lot further than that"), threatened to pull troops from Italy and Spain (“Spain has been horrible" — Spain had refused base access, Italy had denied use of a Sicilian airbase)
  • May 4 — Accused the EU of “not complying" with the Turnberry trade deal and threatened 25% tariffs on European cars; the Eurogroup president rejected the accusation and said “all options are on the table"
  • May 14 — Cancelled the planned 4,000-troop deployment to Poland; the UK, Poland and Lithuania were told deliveries of American weapons would be delayed (the Iran war had drained the stockpiles)
  • May 21 (collateral damage) — The Hormuz crisis drove up oil prices and inflation, forcing the EU to cut its 2026 growth forecast
  • Jun 26 — Threatened 100% tariffs on European imports if Europe implemented digital services taxes
  • Jul 8 — At the NATO summit in Ankara: “Spain is a terrible partner in NATO. They don’t participate. They don’t pay. I don’t want anything to do with Spain" — then, turning to Treasury Secretary Bessent: “Cut off all trade with Spain, please, including visits"
  • Jul 24 — Launched a Section 301 investigation into the EU’s own tech laws, the DMA and DSA (after Google’s €890 million fine): “Europe is not a piggy bank"; the same day, threatened more tariffs to counter the EU’s “hefty fines" on American tech companies
  • Jul 31 — Section 232 pharmaceutical tariffs took effect: the EU and Switzerland capped at 15% thanks to their deals; the UK facing 110% until it signs a drug-pricing agreement
  • Aug 7 — Kept pressuring reluctant European governments to join a Hormuz naval coalition
  • Aug 16 — Gutted the US–South Korea exercises and publicly praised Kim Jong-un; an EU official openly criticized his “attitude toward allies" — Europe saw its own future in what happened to Seoul

I trust that from these two long lists, you can see it plainly: Comrade Vladimir Trump has been hard-working. Quietly, comprehensively, and at a relentless pace, he is executing a 180-degree turn of the United States: dictatorial China is now his ally, and democratic Europe his enemy.

Now think about what he said just days ago: Kim Jong-un is his good friend who has never caused any trouble.

Bare in mind what Kim Jong-un actually is doing right now. Tens of thousands of his elite troops are fighting in the heart of European, above which his missiles are raining down. NATO allies — Germany, France, Britain, Poland — agree unanimously that Russia, with Kim’s full backing, has already started a hybrid war against Europe, and that a real shooting war is imminent.

Would you call a man who poses a mortal threat to your allies your good friend?

Who are China, Russia, North Korea and Europe to Comrade Trump — friend or enemy? Could it be any more obvious?

The extent of Comrade Trump’s admiration for Comrade Kim Jong-un must be common knowledge by now. Time and again, he has pulled out the letters Kim sent him and shown them off to his guests.

There’s one thing I don’t understand. If my housekeeper wrote me a letter, I wouldn’t show it off. If a colleague or friend wrote me a letter, I wouldn’t show that off either. But if Jack Ma or the Australian prime minister wrote me a letter, then perhaps I would. So when Comrade Trump repeatedly shows off Kim Jong-un’s letters, doesn’t that suggest that, somewhere in his subconscious, he regards Kim as being far above him in status?

After he issued this effusive statement to his idol, his idol didn’t even bother responding. Instead, Kim’s sister, Kim Yo Jong, said: “We have no interest in it at all.”

American readers, please tell me: since your country was founded in 1776, has there ever been another president who so abjectly kissed the ass of a murderous, cold-blooded devil, only to be treated with such indifference in return?

Only two years into his tenor, Comrade Trump has increased America’s debt from 36 trillion to 40. America’s financial collapse appears to be just around the corner. His big and beautiful tax cut and his war against Iran greatly accelerated the debt explosion.

Was it because he is an idiot? Even if you randomly pick your decisions, you can still get half of them right. How come everything Comrade Trump did was a stab at the most vulnerable spot of America?

I have read history, ancient and modern, Chinese and Western, and I follow world politics and military affairs closely. I have never seen such a meticulous fool.

我的預言應驗:川普親獨裁,以民主盟友爲敵

2025年1月,川普剛上台,在《美國開始匈牙利化的第一批信號》中,我預言:

一旦獨裁者開始集權,他就會進入一個惡性循環:越集權,反對力量越強大,他的不安全感越強(因為民主國家的領袖下台仍然吃香喝辣,但獨裁者下台會入獄甚至肉體死亡),他就越想集權。

那時,集權者心裡的優先順序就變了,國家的利益就要讓位於自己權力的穩固,任何反對自己集權的人都是對自己身家性命的威脅,任何不反對自己集權、尤其是會幫助自己集權的人,都是最好的盟友。

…

中俄一定會樂見美國滑入集權體制,所以他們一定會向美國獨裁者伸出援手。所以後者一定會像對字節跳動回心轉意一樣,與俄國、中國改善關係,構建獨裁者同盟。

現在應驗了沒有?

咱們來盤點一下弗拉基米爾·川普同志在2026年的8個月裏做了什麼——保證你能毫無疑問地看出誰是他的盟友,誰是他的敵人。

關於中國:

  • 1月13日 — 對於AI競賽至關重要的H200等級晶片,對華出口政策由「原則否准」改為「逐案審查」
  • 1月22日 — TikTok交割完成:字節保住約20%股權與演算法
  • 1月23日 — 《國防戰略》寫明目標「不支配中國,也不封鎖或羞辱他們」
  • 2月4日 — 「極好」的通話;中方通稿記載川普說「我希望看到中國成功」
  • 2月8日 — 黎智英判刑20年——美方零反制
  • 2月10日 — 緝毒局恢復與中國公安部的警務合作
  • 2月13日 — 五角大廈兩天內兩度撤回「中國軍工企業」名單更新(原要列入阿里、百度、比亞迪)
  • 2月20日 — 最高法院推翻IEEPA關稅;白宮改用不分國別的替代方案,中國降稅幅度全球最大
  • 2月26日 — 輝達拿到第一張H200對中出口許可
  • 年中 — 新疆強迫勞動執法悄悄停擺(海關扣貨額暴跌87%)
  • 5月12日 — 對習近平說:「你是偉大的領導人……能做你的朋友是我的榮幸」
  • 5月14日 — 十家中國企業(阿里、騰訊、字節、京東等)獲准採購H200
  • 5月14日 — 「中美戰略穩定關係」入文;美方通稿完全不提台灣
  • 5月15日 — 「我不希望有誰跑去搞獨立」;稱對台軍售是「很好的談判籌碼」
  • 5月15日 — 人權不在峰會議程;黎智英提了一句就算了
  • 5月18日 — 成立美中貿易委員會與投資委員會;300億美元互降關稅框架原則達成
  • 5月19日 — 140億美元對台軍售包裹遭凍結
  • 5月28日 — 美中海上軍事磋商在夏威夷復會
  • 6月2日 — 貿易代表署正式徵詢業界該砍哪些對中關稅(2018年以來首次)
  • 6月8日 — 將中海油、中遠等十家企業從「中國軍工企業」制裁名單中移除。
  • 6月16日 — 「印太」二字取消:印太司令部改回太平洋司令部
  • 6月20日 — 「你知道誰非常聰明嗎——中國的習主席」
  • 7月17日 — 全面解除對香港的制裁,48名官員(含李家超、林鄭月娥)全數移出SDN名單;中國商務部稱這是「落實經貿會談共識的重要一步」
  • 7月27日 — 北京稱美方承諾替代關稅上限20%
  • 8月13日 — 美軍最後一艘航母(華盛頓號)撤出西太平洋,調往中東;《環球時報》慶祝「美軍航母零存在區」
  • 8月17日 — 美韓「乙支自由之盾」演習遭砍:十一天變五天,反攻階段整個取消
  • 8月19日 — 本屆任內台海航行次數腰斬(14次 vs 拜登32次)
  • 8月19日 — 首批H200運抵中國:字節、騰訊各約一萬顆

對於歐洲北約盟友呢?

  • 1月5日 — 格陵蘭危機重燃:再度拒絕排除動武,赫格塞斯稱軍事手段「永遠是選項」;川普:「不管用哪種方式,我們都會拿到格陵蘭」
  • 1月7日 — 一口氣退出66個國際組織與條約,包括聯合國氣候公約;歐洲齊聲譴責「新低點」
  • 1月17日 — 對八個歐洲北約盟國(丹麥、英國、德國、法國、荷蘭、挪威、瑞典、芬蘭)課10%關稅,揚言6月1日加到25%,「直到達成完整且徹底購買格陵蘭的協議為止」;八國發表聯合聲明抗議
  • 2月5日與19日 — 公然介入歐盟成員國選舉 ,為匈牙利奧爾班站台
  • 2月15日 — 魯比歐在慕尼黑安全會議延續《國安戰略》調門,把歐洲的「文明衰落」歸咎於「氣候邪教」與「大規模移民」;歐盟外交高代表卡拉斯正式反駁「文明抹除」論
  • 2月20日 — 最高法院推翻IEEPA關稅後,數小時內改用第122條課10%全球附加稅——不讓歐洲從判決中得到任何喘息,也抽掉了美歐貿易協議的法律地基
  • 3月15日 — 為打伊朗,點名要求七個(多為歐洲)國家派軍艦打通荷姆茲海峽,警告「拒絕的我們會記住」;歐盟領導人集體拒絕軍事介入
  • 3月17日 — 遭拒後發文開罵:「我們不再『需要』、也不想要北約國家的協助——我們從來就不需要!」;
  • 4月1日 — 稱「認真考慮」退出北約;魯比歐說美國將「重新審視」北約的價值
  • 4月7日 — 罵北約是普京根本不怕的「紙老虎」;同場重提格陵蘭:「我們要格陵蘭。他們不給。我就說『拜拜』」
  • 5月1日 — 報復拒戰盟友:下令從德國撤軍5000人以上(「還會砍得更多」)、揚言從義大利與西班牙撤軍(「西班牙爛透了」——西班牙曾拒絕基地使用、義大利拒借西西里空軍基地)
  • 5月4日 — 以歐盟「不履行」特恩貝里協議為由,揚言對歐洲汽車課25%關稅;歐元集團主席駁斥指控,稱「所有選項都在桌上」
  • 5月14日 — 取消原定4000人的波蘭部署;英國、波蘭、立陶宛被告知美製武器交付將延遲(伊朗戰爭耗盡彈藥庫存)
  • 5月21日(背景損害) — 霍爾姆斯海峽危機推高油價與通膨,歐盟被迫下修2026年成長預測
  • 6月26日 — 揚言若歐洲實施數位服務稅,對歐洲進口品課100%關稅
  • 7月8日 — 北約峰會(安卡拉)上:「西班牙是北約裡糟糕透頂的夥伴。他們不參與、不繳錢。我不想跟西班牙有任何瓜葛」——轉頭對財長貝森特說:「把跟西班牙的貿易全砍了,麻煩你,連訪問也一起」
  • 7月24日 — 對歐盟《數位市場法》《數位服務法》本身啟動301條款調查(Google被DMA罰8.9億歐元後):「歐洲不是提款機」;同日揚言加碼關稅反制歐盟對美國科技公司的「高額罰款」
  • 7月31日 — 232條款藥品關稅生效:歐盟與瑞士因有協議上限15%;英國在達成藥價協議前面對110%
  • 8月7日 — 持續施壓不情願的歐洲各國加入荷姆茲海軍聯盟
  • 8月16日 — 砍美韓聯合軍演、公開讚金正恩,歐盟官員公開批評他「對待盟友的態度」,歐洲從首爾的遭遇看到了自己的處境

我相信,從上述兩個長長的清單,你應該可以看出,弗拉基米爾·川普同志真的很勤奮,他真的沒閒着,他正在低調、全面、緊鑼密鼓地將美國進行180度的大轉向:獨裁的中國是他的盟友,民主的歐洲是他的敵人。

尤其是他幾天前剛剛發表的言論和決定:金正恩是他的好朋友,一直沒有找麻煩。

要知道,金正恩的幾萬精銳軍隊正在歐洲腹地作戰,金正恩的導彈導彈正在歐洲上空紛飛,北約盟友包括德國、法國、英國、波蘭一致認爲,金正恩全力支持的俄國已經對歐洲發起了灰色戰爭,而真正的開槍開炮的戰爭已經迫在眉睫。

你會管正在對你的盟友構成致命威脅的人叫好朋友嗎?

中、俄、北韓、歐洲在川普同志眼裏是敵是友,是不是昭然若揭?

川普同志對金正恩同志的崇拜程度應該是盡人皆知吧?他無數次把金正恩給他的信拿出來向賓客炫耀。我不明白一點:我家保姆給我寫的信,我不會拿出來炫耀;我同事或朋友給我的信,我也不會炫耀;馬雲或者澳洲總理給我的信,我或許會炫耀。川普同志一次次拿出金正恩的信來炫耀,是不是說明,在他的潛意識裡,金的地位遠遠高於他?

他對偶像發出這個熱情洋溢的聲明後,他的偶像理都沒理,他妹妹金與正說:“我們對此毫無興趣。”

美國的讀者們,請告訴我,從你們國家1776年建國以來,可曾有任何一個總統如此卑賤地去親一個殺人不眨眼的惡魔的屁股,結果被人家如此冷遇的?

上台二年,美國國債從36萬億美元突破40萬億。美國財政破產、經濟崩潰呼之欲出。弗拉基米爾·川普同志的大減稅和伊朗戰爭起到了很大的加速效果。

川普同志是白癡嗎?就是完全隨機決定,至少你還有一半做對的可能性,對不對?怎麼可能刀刀都奔着美國的命門呢?

反正熟讀古今中外歷史、密切跟蹤中外政治軍事的我,沒見過一個如此全面佈局、緊鑼密鼓、刀刀見血的蠢貨。

Ukraine War (46): Why Do Ukraine’s Drones Spare Russian Missile Factories?

Ukraine’s drones are wrecking Russia’s economy on a massive scale — oil refineries, the enormous warehouse complexes of Wildberries (Russia’s Amazon), ports and grain export facilities — posing a grave threat to Russia’s ability to sustain its war of aggression. I discussed this in depth in Ukraine War (44): A Summary of the Current State of the War and Ukraine War (45): The Relationship Between Ukraine and NATO Is Quietly Changing — Ukraine is turning the tables on its attacker.

But at the same time, because Vladimir Trump has completely cut off the supply of Patriot missiles to Ukraine (which doesn’t surprise me in the least), Russian ballistic missiles are killing Ukrainian civilians in ever greater numbers. In the coming winter, they will destroy Ukraine’s power and heating systems, threatening the country’s very survival.

Now the whole world is asking the same question:

“If Ukraine’s drones can inflict such devastating losses on Russia and the latter has no counting measure, why can’t they take out Russia’s missile factories?“

No media outlet, and none of the military experts they interview, has given a clear answer.

What makes Ukraine’s drones so hard for Russia to counter is not advanced technology like stealth or speed. They are slow, they fly low, and they have no stealth features or infrared-signature reduction of any kind. Russian air defence missiles can easily shoot down anyone of them. But precisely because there is nothing high-tech about them, they are dirt cheap — a small fraction of the cost of a Russian anit-air missile, so Ukraine doesn’t care how many get shot down. Quite the opposite: the more Russia shoots down, the faster its treasury bleeds. Ukraine’s strategy is to launch drones in overwhelming numbers, so that, after Russia’s air defence missiles run dry, and after subtracting the drones downed by direct-fire weapons around the target, enough still get through to hit it.

But drones like these are no threat to a Russian missile factory.

The buildings that house Russia’s production of expensive missiles are nothing like an ordinary factory, with a roof of corrugated sheet metal a few millimetres thick over a layer of insulation — the kind that a drone carrying a few kilograms of explosives can blow open and set on fire. Most of the missile factories are built of military-grade, blast-resistant reinforced concrete. Even hundreds of kilograms of explosives detonating outside a building like that would not do meaningful damage. Every munition designed to defeat hardened facilities of this kind has an extremely tough casing, substantial weight and a delayed-action fuze; it must strike the target’s critical point with pinpoint accuracy, at very high speed and at exactly the right angle, punching through the hardened layer before detonating inside.

And once an aircraft has to weigh hundreds of kilograms or even several tonnes, fly at very high speed, and deliver that kind of precision and angle of attack, it no longer costs merely 50 thousand dollars. Its price jumps to hundreds of thousands — approaching that of a Russian air defence missile. With drones like that, Ukraine could no longer launch 500 a day, shrug off the losses, and count on 5% getting through. It could launch no more than twenty or 50 a day — and Russian air defences could shoot down every last one.

Ukraine’s overall technological base and industrial scale are far smaller than Russia’s. If Ukraine went down this road, it would be pitting its weaknesses against the enemy’s strengths — and it would inevitably lose the war.

If these weapons are to survive Russian air defences, they need stealth and low infrared signatures — like Storm Shadow — at which point they cost even more than the Russian missiles. Ukraine today has neither the technology nor the money for that.

This is why Ukraine’s drones have set Russia ablaze with smoke rising everywhere, yet leave its missile factories untouched.

All Ukraine can do now is strike at the root: bring Russia’s economy to collapse, until it can no longer sustain the war.

烏戰深度解析(46):爲什麼烏軍的無人機單單放過俄國的導彈工廠?

烏軍的無人機正在大規模地摧毀俄國的經濟,比如石油冶煉設施、俄國的亞馬遜——野莓的巨大的倉儲中心、港口和糧食出口設施,對俄國繼續侵略戰爭的能力造成了極大威脅。我在《 烏戰深度解析(44):烏戰現狀總結 》和《烏戰深度解析(45):烏克蘭和北約的關係正在悄然變化 》中深入討論了這個問題——烏克蘭正在反客爲主。

但同時,因爲弗拉基米爾·川普徹底切斷了對烏克蘭的愛國者導彈的供應(我一點都不喫驚),俄國的彈道導彈正在以越來越大的規模殺死烏克蘭的老百姓,在即將到來的冬季,它們會摧毀烏克蘭的電力、供暖系統,對烏克蘭的生存造成巨大威脅。

現在,全世界都在問這個問題:

“既然烏軍的無人機能夠對俄國造成如此慘重的損失,讓俄國束手無策,爲什麼不能全面摧毀俄國生產導彈的工廠?”

沒有任何媒體和媒體所採訪的軍事專家給出了清晰明了的答案。

烏軍的無人機之所以讓俄軍束手無策,靠的不是隱形、高速等高科技。它們速度慢,高度底,沒有任何隱身、減少紅外特徵的能力,俄軍防空導彈有能力打下任何一架,但正是因爲沒有高科技,它們非常便宜,是俄軍導彈的幾十分之一,所以烏軍根本不怕任何一架被打下來,相反,打下來的越多,俄國財政的失血就越多。烏軍靠的是發射數目極大的無人機,在俄軍防空導彈打完後,在扣除被目標周圍直射武器打下來的之後,仍然有足夠的數量擊中目標。

但這樣的無人機對俄國的導彈工廠沒有威脅。

俄國的生產昂貴導彈的工廠廠房不像一般工廠那樣,房頂是幾毫米厚的波浪形鐵皮,下面是隔溫材料,一架載幾公斤炸藥的無人機就能炸壞並點着火。它們大多是由軍用級別的防爆破的鋼筋混凝土建造的。即便是幾百公斤的炸藥,在這種混凝土廠房的外面爆炸 ,都無法造成足夠的破壞。所有針對這類加固設施的彈藥,都有極其堅硬的外殼、足夠的重量和延時爆炸引信,以極高的速度和準確的角度,準確擊中目標的關鍵部位,穿透加固層後在內部引爆。

而當一架飛行器需要幾百公斤甚至幾噸重,以極高的速度飛行,保證極高的精度和角度時,這架飛行器就不可能幾萬美元一架了,相反,它的價格就到了幾十萬美元,接近了俄軍防空導彈的價位。這樣的無人機,烏克蘭就沒法每天發射500架,任憑大多數被擊落,只要5%擊中就行。這樣的無人機,烏克蘭一天能發射的數目超不過二三十枚,俄軍的防空導彈可以擊落全部。

烏克蘭的綜合科技水平和工業規模遠小於俄國,如果烏軍朝這個方向走下去,它就是在以己之短攻敵人之長,必然輸掉戰爭。

而如果想讓這些飛行器不被俄軍導彈擊落,它們就必須有隱身、低紅外特徵,比如風暴陰影,那麼它們的價格就會比俄軍的防空導彈還貴,烏克蘭現在沒有這樣的科技和財力。

這就是爲什麼烏克蘭的無人機把俄國炸得處處濃煙滾滾,卻單單放過俄國的導彈工廠的原因。

烏克蘭現在能做的,只有釜底抽薪,讓俄國的經濟崩潰,無力支撐其戰爭努力。

Ukraine War (45): The Relationship Between Ukraine and NATO Is Quietly Changing

From the start of the war until a year ago, Ukraine was, in NATO’s eyes, a great burden — its war with Russia carried the risk of dragging NATO into war with Russia, even nuclear war.

Imagine you are the boss of one of New York’s two great crime families — the Gambinos. You and the Genovese family each have your own turf, live and let live, each raking in fortunes and living the high life. Then one day, one of your made men gets into a fight with the Genoveses — a blood feud, irreconcilable. If you don’t back him, you’ll be seen as a coward with no sense of loyalty, and your soldiers will desert you. But if you do back him, the Gambinos and the Genoveses could be plunged into a fight to the death — rivers of blood, both families crippled.

So you have no choice but to prop him up just enough to keep him from being wiped out, while carefully avoiding a total rupture with the Genoveses. Day after day you walk a tightrope; one wrong step and the sky falls in. Deep down, you surely wish you could turn back time and never have taken this man into the family.

From the start of the war until a year ago, this is largely how NATO saw Ukraine.

But over the past year, Ukraine’s fighting power has begun to swell rapidly. I summed this up in my August 2, 2026 piece, Ukraine War (44): A Summary of the Current State of the War. Though it lacks the death-defying sense of honor of the British and American militaries, the Ukrainian army — forged and winnowed through four years of bloody war — is one of only two armies in the world fully adapted to warfare in the drone age, and the only army in the world guaranteed to fight to a standstill, at minimal cost, against the Russian army that has been forged and winnowed through the same four years of bloody war and is equally adapted to drone-age warfare. If the Russian army were to attack Poland, as NATO intelligence has predicted, we would very likely see the Polish army — far better equipped than the Ukrainians — suffer great losses; even a collapse would not be entirely out of the question.

Recent reports say that the anti-missile interceptor Ukraine has been developing with NATO support may enter production within months. Bear in mind that anti-missile interceptors are far harder to build than missiles, and the Russian army currently possesses essentially no anti-missile capability — the much-hyped S-400 offers essentially no defense against the NATO missiles Ukraine launches. If Ukraine’s interceptor really can enter production that quickly, then the overall strength of the Ukrainian army may in fact rank among the very best in Europe.

It’s as if that man of yours who fought the Genoveses had, through years of bloody struggle, built up a crew of crack shots and master knife-fighters, fearless and ferocious, who fought the Genoveses to a draw with not much help from you — while your own soldiers, after years of soft living, can no longer shoot straight and faint at the sight of blood. Would you still treat him as a burden then?

What would be going through your mind?

“I’d better keep on this man’s good side and make sure he stays with me. Otherwise, if he ever goes over to the Genoveses one day, I’m finished."

A year ago, NATO would not agree to accept Ukraine, because Ukraine was continuously losing ground. The very second Ukraine joined NATO, NATO would automatically be at war with Russia — because under Article 5 of the NATO charter, if new member Ukraine comes under large-scale armed attack, NATO must join the fight.

Today, for the very same reason, NATO still will not agree to accept Ukraine.

But in NATO’s eyes, Ukraine is no longer a burden. It is now a vital partner that must be respected and carefully maintained, because it is one of the strongest military powers in Europe. The rich experience and technology Ukraine has accumulated on the battlefield are an indispensable resource for NATO. Without that experience and technology, if a battle-hardened Russian army that has mastered drone-age warfare were to attack NATO, NATO could suffer devastating losses — its defensive lines might even collapse.

A worse possibility — though a small one — is that someday a Ukrainian strongman in the mold of Putin comes to power. At that point, if NATO still refuses Ukraine membership as before, still helps Ukraine only with one hand tied behind its back, he could say to the Ukrainian people:

“Look! We sacrificed a million of our young to shield Europe from Russia’s assault, and still Europe shows no gratitude, still shuts us out. Europe is not the hope for Ukraine’s security. We must normalize relations with Russia."

If he could consolidate power in Ukraine the way Putin has in Russia, then the odds of his becoming Putin’s ally would be high. An alliance between two of Europe’s foremost military powers would be the ultimate nightmare for Europe — and for the world.

Remember what I always tell my readers: what goes unsaid often matters more than what is said?

Though you will hear nothing of this from NATO publicly, the relationship between NATO and Ukraine has already quietly changed — no longer a one-way valve with NATO endlessly transfusing blood into Ukraine, but a near-equal partnership in which each side urgently needs the other.

烏戰深度解析(45):烏克蘭和北約的關係正在悄然變化

從開戰直到一年前,烏克蘭在北約眼裏是一個大累贅,它和俄國的戰爭有導致北約和俄國之間發生戰爭甚至核戰爭的危險。

好比你是上海灘二大幫派之一,青紅幫的幫主。你和斧頭幫之間各有各的地盤,彼此相安無事,各自大發其財,喫香喝辣。忽然有一天,你的一個兄弟和斧頭幫打起來了,彼此不共戴天。如果你不幫他,會被視爲膽小如鼠,不講義氣,必然衆叛親離。但如果你替他撐腰,那青紅幫和斧頭幫則可能陷入你死我活的火併,血流成河,元氣大傷。

所以,你不得不一邊替他撐腰,防止他被滅門,一邊又小心不和斧頭幫徹底撕破臉。你終日像走鋼絲一樣小心,一步走錯,天就塌下來了。你心裏一定希望時光倒回,你沒收這個兄弟弟入夥。

從開戰直到一年前,北約就是這樣看烏克蘭的。

但最近一年以來,烏克蘭的戰力開始迅速膨脹。我在2026年8月2日的烏戰深度解析(44):烏戰現狀總結一文中總結了這一點。雖然缺乏英美軍隊的視死如歸的榮譽感,但經過了四年血腥的戰爭的淘汰和冶煉,烏軍是世界上唯二之一的完全適應了無人機時代的戰爭的軍隊,也是世界上唯一一隻保證能以最小的代價和同樣經過了四年血腥的戰爭的淘汰和冶煉,同樣適應了無人機時代戰爭的俄軍打成平手的軍隊。如果俄軍如北約情報所預言的那樣進攻波蘭,我們很可能看到裝備遠好於烏軍的波蘭軍隊在最初階段的損失遠遠大於烏軍,甚至土崩瓦解都不是完全沒有可能。

最近的消息說,烏克蘭在北約支持下研製的反導導彈可能於幾個月內就投產。要知道,反導導彈比導彈難度大得多,現在俄軍基本上不具備任何反導能力,吹得神乎其神的S400對烏克蘭發射的北約導彈基本上沒有防禦能力。如果烏克蘭的反導導彈能夠這麼快投產,那麼烏軍的整體實力實際上可能是歐洲數一數二的。

就好比你那個和斧頭幫火併的兄弟,在幾年的浴血奮戰中發展出一隻槍法如神、刀法嫺熟、敢打敢拼的隊伍,基本上不需要你的幫助,就和斧頭幫打了個平手,而你自己手下的隊伍經過常年的養尊處優已經槍打不準,看見血就暈,這時,你還會把他當累贅嗎?

這時你心裏會怎麼想?

“我可得與這個兄弟搞好關係,確保他一直站在我這邊,否則,一旦他將來某一天倒向斧頭幫,我分分鐘被滅。”

一年前北約絕不會同意烏克蘭加入,因爲烏克蘭在持續失地。烏克蘭在加入北約的那一秒鐘,北約就自動與俄國處在戰爭狀態,因爲根據北約章程第五條,新成員烏克蘭遭到大規模武裝進攻,北約必須應戰。

現在,因爲同樣的原因,北約仍然不會同意烏克蘭加入。

但在北約眼裏,烏克蘭已經不再是一個累贅,而是一個必須尊重且努力維繫的重要伙伴,因爲它是歐洲戰力最強的軍事強國之一。烏克蘭在戰場上積累的豐富經驗和技術是北約不可或缺的寶貴資源,沒有這些經驗和技術,一旦久經戰陣、掌握了無人機時代戰爭的俄軍向北約進攻,北約可能付出慘重的損失,甚至防線崩潰。

更糟糕的可能性——雖然很小——是將來某一天,一個普京一樣的烏克蘭強人上台。那時,如果北約仍然像以前那樣拒絕烏克蘭加入,在幫助烏克蘭上束手束腳,他就可能對烏克蘭人說:

“你們看!我們犧牲了一百萬年輕人,爲歐洲擋住了俄國的進攻,但歐洲仍然不感謝我們,仍然將我們拒之門外。歐洲不是烏克蘭安全的希望,我們必須和俄國關係正常化。”

如果他能像普京一樣在烏克蘭完成集權,那麼他成爲普京的盟友的可能性就很大。二個歐洲戰力數一數二的國家結盟,將是歐洲乃至世界的終極噩夢。

還記得我總對我的讀者們說,沒說出的話往往比說出來的更重要?

雖然你們聽不到北約的任何這方面的言論,但北約和烏克蘭之間的關係已經悄然變化,不再是北約不斷向烏克蘭輸血的單向閥,而是一個彼此迫切需要對方的近乎平等的伙伴關係。